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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea-expression doctrine has become an axiom of 
copyright law.1  The doctrine ensures that the property rights 
created by the copyright and patent laws are well defined.2  It 
maintains the division between private right and public domain.3  
By drawing a line between what can and cannot be protected by a 
copyright, it provides comfort and certainty to those who draw on 
the ideas of others.4  The doctrine is central to the constitutional 
mandate of promoting the useful arts and sciences because it 
maintains the vital division between the patent and copyright laws 
that facilitates subject matter based regulation in patents and 
subject matter independent regulation in copyrights.5  Such a 
division safeguards the delicate balance between the First 
Amendment and the incentive based intellectual property laws.6 
Yet, when Congress acts pursuant to its Commerce,7 Treaty,8 
or Taxing and Spending powers,9 rather than the power granted to 
it under the Intellectual Property Clause,10 does this fundamental 
doctrine of copyright law nevertheless apply?  The answer to this 
question depends on two seemingly intractable questions: First, 
whether congressional grants of power qualify one another, and 
 
 1 See infra note 110. 
 2 See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra note 215. 
 4 See infra Part III.A. 
 5 See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text. 
 6 Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one 
hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and 
commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended 
repeatedly.”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (“[The idea-
expression doctrine] strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and 
copyright law by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.” (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985))). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 8 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 9 Id. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 10 Id. at cl. 8. 
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second, whether the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional 
requirement.  If the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional 
doctrine, and if an exercise of congressional power under an 
alternate grant would circumvent the doctrine’s constraints, then 
the two provisions would be in conflict, requiring one 
constitutional provision to yield to the other. 
This Note will argue that the idea-expression doctrine is a 
constitutional requirement embedded in the Intellectual Property 
Clause’s distinction between the useful arts and sciences.  This 
Note will further argue for the application of a new test that 
balances the purposes of the qualifying doctrine against the 
purpose of the constitutional provision being qualified. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the constitutional grants of 
power that can be used to promulgate copyright-like legislation 
and the tension inherent in using an alternate grant of constitutional 
power to circumvent the requirements of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.  Part III of this Note will survey the facets of the idea-
expression doctrine and its corollaries to illustrate the doctrine’s 
underlying purposes.  Part IV will argue that the idea-expression 
dichotomy finds its constitutional source in the distinction between 
the useful arts and sciences.  By mentioning both kinds of works, 
the Constitution may have contemplated a division between a 
regime of protection that provides monopolies for ideas after 
careful examination of subject matter, and a regime that protects 
only expression regardless of the subject matter. 
Conflicts between constitutional grants of power have been 
resolved in two traditional ways.  First, the more subject-matter 
specific grant of power must qualify the more general one.11  The 
second possible way to resolve the conflict is to allow 
congressional action to the extent of the broadest constitutional 
grant of power.12  This would make the Commerce Clause the final 
arbiter of congressional power.  This Note will instead propose a 
new canon of constitutional construction to resolve conflicts 
between horizontal constitutional provisions.  Part V introduces the 
Horizontal Subordination test, a balancing test that determines 
 
 11 See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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whether one constitutional provision should qualify another.  
Applying this test will ensure that the delicate balance of 
enumerated and limited federal powers persists amidst overlapping 
constitutional grants of congressional power. 
II. USING ALTERNATE CONGRESSIONAL POWERS TO PROTECT 
EXPRESSIVE WORKS 
 
 The copyright and patent laws find their constitutional support 
in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power to protect writings and inventions for 
limited times.  Yet, many such works could also be regulated under 
other constitutional grants of power.  For example, many 
copyrighted works travel through or substantially affect interstate 
commerce,13 bringing their protection within the purview of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution.14  This section 
will discuss the various alternate sources of constitutional power 
that can be used to protect intellectual property rights that are 
similar to those conferred under the copyright and patent laws. 
This section will discuss the Commerce Clause, the Treaty 
Power, and the Taxing and Spending Power as alternate means of 
protecting intellectual property rights.  This section will also 
describe the problems inherent in employing an alternate 
congressional power to accomplish legislative goals that would 
typically be subject to the constraints of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.  Among the problems that arise are difficulties in 
delineating the metes and bounds of the intellectual property right 
being conferred and in maintaining the current division between 
patent and copyright law. 
 
 13 A recording artist’s success, for example, is generally measured by national, and 
even international, sales. See, e.g., Robert Palmer, The Year’s Best: 1984 In Review; Pop 
Music Made A Comeback And Video Helped It Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1984, § 2, at 19 
(describing artists’ success in terms of national album sales).  With the advent of music 
videos, music is very much a business dependent on interstate sales. Id. 
 14 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Generally 
speaking, performing artists who attract bootleggers are those who are sufficiently 
popular that their appeal crosses state or national lines.”). 
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A. The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate economic 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.15  Although 
the current interpretation of the Commerce Clause supports 
legislation that meets the test articulated in United States v. 
Lopez,16 the Commerce Clause had not always been so expansively 
interpreted.17 
One of the earliest attempts to regulate intellectual property 
rights under the Commerce Clause failed because of a narrow 
interpretation of the clause.  The Supreme Court decided the 
validity of a federal intellectual property statute in The Trademark 
Cases.18  The statute in that case imposed criminal sanctions for 
violating trademark rights.19  After finding that the power to pass 
 
 15 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“[T]he proper test requires an 
analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of 
home-grown wheat). 
 16 United States v. Lopez required, among other things, legislative findings, a 
jurisdictional element, and a logical nexus between the economic activity and interstate 
commerce. See 514 U.S. at 560–64. 
 17 See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
299, 306 (1851) (finding that state regulation that affected intrastate activity was not a 
regulation of interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824) 
(“The power of regulating commerce extends to the regulation of navigation.  The power 
to regulate commerce extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the 
United States and foreign nations, and among the several States.  It does not stop at the 
external boundary of a State.  But it does not extend to a commerce which is completely 
internal.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 18 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 19 Act of August 14, 1876, ch. 274, §§ 4–5, 19 Stat. 141, 141–42.  The statute stated the 
following: 
Section 4. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person 
or persons, knowingly and willfully cast, engrave, or manufacture, or have in his, 
her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any die or dies, plate 
or plates, brand or brands, engraving or engravings, on wood, stone, metal, or other 
substance, moulds, or any false representation, likeness, copy, or colorable imitation 
of any die, plate, brand, engraving, or mould of any private label, brand, stamp, 
wrapper, engraving on paper or other substance, or trade-mark, registered pursuant 
to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as 
prescribed in the first section of this act. 
Section 5. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person 
or persons, knowingly and willfully make, forge, or counterfeit, or have in his, her, 
or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any representation, 
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the legislation could not be derived from the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution,20 the Court turned to the Commerce 
Clause for an affirmative grant of congressional power.21  In doing 
so, the Court searched for a jurisdictional element in the statute,22 
noting that “[i]f . . . the statute described persons engaged in a 
commerce between the different States, and related to the use of 
trade-marks in such commerce, it would be evident that Congress 
believed it was acting under the clause of the Constitution which 
authorizes it to regulate commerce among the States.”23 
The Court found no such jurisdictional element in the statute.24  
Noting the broad language of the provision, the Court stated that 
the Act’s “broad purpose was to establish a universal system of 
trade-mark registration . . . without regard to the character of the 
trade to which it was to be applied or the residence of the 
owner . . . .”25  The Court then struck down the legislation as a 
constitutionally inadequate exercise of congressional power.26  
Implicit in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Trademark Cases is 
 
likeness, similitude, copy, or colorable imitation of any private label, brand, stamp, 
wrapper, engraving, mould, or trade-mark, registered pursuant to the Statutes of the 
United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first 
section of this act. 
Id. 
 20 Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (“[W]e are unable to see any such power in the 
constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and 
discoveries.”). 
 21 See id. at 94–95. 
 22 See id. at 97.  The Supreme Court still searches for a jurisdictional element in its 
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
613 (2000) (“[The statute] contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal 
cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.”); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (“[The Statute] has no express 
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions 
that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”); 
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[The statute] also 
contains no jurisdictional element as is commonly found in criminal statutes passed under 
authority of the Commerce Clause.  That is, there is no requirement that, for example, the 
bootleg copies or phonorecords have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 23 Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97. 
 24 See id. at 98. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 99 (“The questions in each of these cases being an inquiry whether these 
statutes can be upheld in whole or in part as valid and constitutional, must be answered in 
the negative . . . .”). 
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the premise that federal law not supported by the Copyright Clause 
of the Constitution can nevertheless find support in the Commerce 
Clause.27  The fact that the Court turned to the Commerce Clause 
as a source of congressional power might imply that the Court 
would have sustained the legislation if the Commerce Clause so 
allowed.28 
The Supreme Court has often searched for alternate forms of 
congressional power to support legislation.29  The mere fact that 
legislation cannot be promulgated under the Commerce Clause 
does not mean that § 5 of the 14th Amendment could not grant 
Congress the requisite power.30  Despite the general rule that 
alternate congressional powers can support the same legislation, 
the narrow scope of congressional power granted by the Copyright 
Clause can be seen as an exception to this rule.31  The Copyright 
Clause, applying to subject matter that is narrower than the subject 
 
 27 The structure of the Court’s analysis supports this premise. See id. at 94–95, 97 
(turning to the Commerce Clause for support after dismissing the argument that the 
legislation could find support in the Intellectual Property Clause). 
 28 See Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated 
Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 
1469 (1992) (“[T]he Court recognized that Congress still could rely on the Commerce 
Clause as an alternative source of legislative power.  Although the Court ultimately held 
the legislation to be unconstitutional, the determination was due primarily to the 
prevailing narrow view of ‘interstate’ commerce and the issue of severability.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon And Kiss Catalog: Can Live 
Performances Be Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1163 
(2005) (“Although that Court found that the Act was not justified by the Commerce 
Clause either, under the modern concept of the Commerce Clause, the Act would have 
been upheld.”). 
 29 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78–80 (2000) (“Because we found the 
ADEA valid under Congress’ Commerce Clause power, we concluded that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether the Act also could be supported by Congress’ power 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Resolution of today’s cases requires us to 
decide that question.” (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983))); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1996) (searching for power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause after noting that the lower court 
did not find the abrogation a valid exercise of the Interstate Commerce Clause or § 5 of 
the 14th Amendment). See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964). 
 30 See Kimel, 582 U.S. at 80 (turning to Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to support 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity). 
 31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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matter regulated by the Commerce Clause,32 may either qualify the 
protection of similar subject matter under the Commerce Clause33 
or preclude regulation of the same subject matter under any other 
constitutional grant of power.34 
1. United States v. Moghadam 
In determining whether copyright-like statutes could be upheld 
under the Commerce Clause, modern courts have grappled with the 
interpretive question of whether a narrower constitutional 
provision qualifies a more general one or precludes any other 
exercise of congressional power altogether.  The Eleventh Circuit 
in United States v. Moghadam35 held that the Commerce Clause 
could support legislation imposing criminal sanctions for the 
bootlegging of live performances.36  The difficulty in upholding 
such a law as a valid exercise of the Intellectual Property Clause is 
that live performances lack fixation.37  After noting that an 
articulation of congressional power is not required in the statute,38 
 
 32 Compare id. (“[S]ecuring for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”), with id. at cl. 3 (“To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”). 
 33 This would be a direct consequence of applying the canon of statutory interpretation 
mandating that specific provisions qualify general ones.  The Supreme Court has applied 
this canon before. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (“Finally, 
our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more 
specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, 
even if the general provision was enacted later.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
475, 489–90 (1973))). 
 34 Such an interpretation would be the only other preclusive alternative to applying the 
narrower provision as qualifying the more general. See, e.g., id. at 489 (“[T]he question 
remains whether the specific federal habeas corpus statute, explicitly and historically 
designed to provide the means for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his 
confinement, must be understood to be the exclusive remedy available in a situation like 
this where it so clearly applies.”). 
 35 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 36 See id. at 1277 (“We hold that the anti-bootlegging statute has a sufficient connection 
to interstate and foreign commerce to meet the Lopez test.”). 
 37 Id. (“[W]e assume arguendo that the [Intellectual Property] Clause could not sustain 
this legislation because live performances, being unfixed, are not encompassed by the 
term ‘Writings’ which includes a fixation requirement.”). 
 38 See id. at 1275 n.10 (“Congress’s failure to cite the Commerce Clause as grounds for 
[the statute] does not eliminate the possibility that the Commerce Clause can sustain this 
legislation.”); see also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The 
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the Eleventh Circuit, citing The Trademark Cases for support,39 
noted that “the fact that legislation reaches beyond the limits of 
one grant of legislative power has no bearing on whether it can be 
sustained under another.”40 
The Moghadam court entertained the argument that legislation 
that fails under one constitutional grant of congressional power 
cannot in some instances be upheld under another.41  The Eleventh 
Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.42  That case involved a statute 
purportedly enacted under Congress’ commerce power that 
overlapped with the protections afforded under the Bankruptcy 
Clause of the Constitution.43  The Court in Railway Labor refused 
to uphold the statute under the Commerce Clause after invalidating 
it under the Bankruptcy Clause.44  The Court reasoned that “if we 
were to hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform 
 
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals 
of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (“An otherwise valid exercise of 
congressional authority is not, of course, invalidated if Congress happens to recite the 
wrong clause . . . or, indeed, if Congress recites no clause at all.” (citing Woods, 333 U.S. 
at 144)); cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (“It is in the nature of our 
review of congressional legislation defended on the basis of Congress’ powers under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to discern some legislative purpose or 
factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power.  That does not mean, however, 
that Congress need anywhere recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ or 
‘equal protection.’” (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476–78 (1980))); 
Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir. 1983) (“The omission of any 
ritualistic incantation of powers by the Congress is not determinative, for there is no 
requirement that the statute incorporate buzz words such as ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ or 
‘section 5’ or ‘equal protection.’” (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 n.18)). 
 39 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278 (“Although the 1876 Act did not survive due to the 
restrictive view of the Commerce Clause prevailing at that time, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that legislation which would 
not be permitted under the Copyright Clause could nonetheless be permitted under the 
Commerce Clause, provided that the independent requirements of the latter are met.”). 
 40 Id. at 1277 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 
(1964)); see also Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir.1986) 
(“[T]he copyright clause is not the only constitutional source of congressional 
power . . . .”). 
 41 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280. 
42 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 43 Id. at 466; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 44 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 468–69. 
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bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would 
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of 
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”45 
The same difficulty arose in Moghadam.  Since the Intellectual 
Property Clause is dramatically narrower than the Commerce 
Clause, upholding the statute under the broader clause would 
enable Congress to circumvent the boundaries of the Intellectual 
Property Clause.  In that case the statute would protect subject 
matter normally protected under the Intellectual Property Clause, 
but without the fixation requirement.46  The Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged that “in some circumstances the Commerce Clause 
indeed may be used to accomplish that which may not have been 
permissible under the [Intellectual Property] Clause.  We hold that 
the instant case is one such circumstance in which the Commerce 
Clause may be thus used.”47 
The Moghadam court held that because the term “writings” in 
the Intellectual Property Clause imposes the fixation requirement, 
the term does not create a constitutional ceiling on the types of 
works that can be protected by Congress, and, therefore, the 
tension between broad and narrow clauses noted in the Railway 
Labor case was not a preclusive issue in the case before the 
court.48 
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the question of whether the 
statute was a proper exercise of the commerce power.  Just as the 
Supreme Court did in the Trademark Cases, the Moghadam court 
searched for a jurisdictional element and found none.49  The 
Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the absence of such an 
element was not dispositive and upheld the statute, stating that 
“[t]he link between bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. at 1280–81 (“The grant itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply 
any negative pregnant that suggests that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on 
Congress’ ability to legislate pursuant to other grants.”). 
 49 Id. at 1275 (“[T]here is no requirement that, for example, the bootleg copies or 
phonorecords have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.”); see supra text 
accompanying notes 20–27 (discussing the Trademark Cases). 
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and commerce with foreign nations is self-evident.”50  The court 
cited two reasons.  First, the court analogized the case to Wickard 
v. Filburn51 and noted that the existence of bootlegged works 
depresses the market for legitimate copies of the work.52  Second, 
the Moghadam court noted that the very fact that bootlegging of a 
work occurs coupled with a market for such bootlegs implies that 
the artists involved are recognized nationally.53 
The Moghadam opinion illustrates that once a court decides 
that legislation can be sustained under the Commerce Clause even 
though the legislation cannot be sustained under the Intellectual 
Property Clause, the issue of whether the statute is a valid exercise 
of the commerce power is rarely difficult to resolve.  The crucial 
issue is whether the Intellectual Property Clause qualifies or 
precludes the exercise of power under an alternative constitutional 
power.  The Moghadam court held that even though an exercise of 
power under the Commerce Clause would circumvent the fixation 
requirement under the Intellectual Property Clause, “[c]ommon 
sense does not indicate that extending copyright-like protection to 
a live performance is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
[Intellectual Property] Clause.”54  Thus, the Moghadam court 
decided not to impose any constraints on Congress when its 
plenary commerce authority overlaps with its power to protect 
intellectual property.55  The core of the issue is whether regulating 
under the Commerce Clause would undermine the integrity of the 
narrower Intellectual Property Clause.  The Moghadam court 
decided this issue in the negative.56 
 
 50 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276. 
 51 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 52 Wickard held that the federally imposed wheat production caps applied to home-
grown wheat because of the effect of the illegitimate wheat on the national market. 317 
U.S. at 127–28. 
 53 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“Generally speaking, performing artists who 
attract bootleggers are those who are sufficiently popular that their appeal crosses state or 
national lines.”). 
 54 Id. at 1281. 
 55 However, the court withheld definitive judgment regarding the use of the Commerce 
Clause to circumvent the Intellectual Property Clause where the two clauses are 
fundamentally inconsistent. See id. at 1281 n.12. 
 56 See id. at 1281–82. 
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2. United States v. Martignon 
The most notable case after Moghadam is United States v. 
Martignon.57  In that case, the Second Circuit considered the 
validity of an anti-bootlegging statute.58  The statute was a product 
of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), specifically the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).59  Upon 
congressional approval of TRIPs, Congress codified the provisions 
of the statute in 1994.60  The statute imposed criminal sanctions on 
bootlegging activity.61  This was the same statute at issue in 
Moghadam.  The Second Circuit, however, framed the issue as 
“whether the Copyright Clause’s limitations also limit Congress’ 
power to regulate creative works under the Commerce Clause.”62 
The court examined the text of the Copyright Clause directly, 
noting that “it is not clear from the wording of the Copyright 
Clause where the grant of power ends and where the limitation(s) 
 
 57 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 58 See generally id.  The anti-bootlegging statute discussed in Martignon is codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000 & Supp. II. 2002) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319A 
(West 2006)).  The portion of the statute at issue in the case provided as follows: 
(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers 
involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain— 
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in a copy or 
phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from an 
unauthorized fixation; 
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or sounds and 
images of a live musical performance; or 
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to rent, or 
traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of 
whether the fixations occurred in the United States; 
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years . . . . 
Id. 
 59 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420; see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter “TRIPs”]. 
 60 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000)). 
 61 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. 
 62 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144. 
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begin(s).”63  The court noted that in Heart of Atlanta, the court 
upheld civil rights litigation under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment despite its invalidity under the commerce clause.64  
Conversely, the court also noted that some cases, such as Gibbons, 
which held that because the bankruptcy and commerce clauses are 
“intimately connected,” legislation that fails under the Bankruptcy 
Clause could not be enacted as Commerce legislation.65 
Given the indeterminacy in the case law, the Second Circuit 
noted that there were two ways to determine whether commerce 
legislation falls within the scope of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.66  The first approach would require the court to examine 
the text of the Constitution to decide whether legislation could 
plausibly fall within the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause.67  
Interpreting the word “secure,” the court noted that any law that 
“creates, bestows, or allocates rights” would fall within the bounds 
of the Clause under such an approach.68  Using a second approach, 
the court could examine the history and context of the clause to 
determine its scope.69  Under this approach, the court noted that for 
a law to be considered a copyright law it would have to at least 
confer property rights.70 
The court noted that under either approach, the statute would 
not fall within the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause.  The 
court reasoned that the statute was a criminal law, neither creating 
nor allocating property rights to authors and inventors.71  Under the 
first approach, the criminal law would not create, bestow, or 
allocate rights, and under the second approach, the law did not 
create any property rights.72  The statute did not grant private rights 
to exclude others from a property interest in the live 
 
 63 Id. at 145. 
 64 See id. at 146 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260–61). 
 65 Id. (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465–66). 
 66 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149–50. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 150. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 151. 
 71 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151. 
 72 Id. 
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performance.73  Instead, the law granted government the power to 
protect the interests of owners of preexisting property rights.74 
Another integral part of the court’s scope analysis was the 
comparison of the rights created under the statute to the rights 
created under § 106 of the Copyright Act.75  The court made the 
comparison to determine how different the statute was from the 
Copyright Act, which would clearly be within the scope of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.  Ultimately, the 
court noted that § 2319A does not create, bestow, or allocate 
property rights in expression, it does not share the defining 
characteristics of other laws that are concededly “copyright laws,” 
and it differs significantly from the Copyright Act that was passed 
pursuant to the Copyright Clause (and that is valid under it).”  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the law fell outside of 
the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, 
avoiding the direct balancing of the Clauses.76 
3. Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport International 
Productions, Inc. 
A district court in California considered a similar issue.  In Kiss 
Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport International Productions, Inc.,77 a judge 
in the Central District of California considered whether an anti-
bootlegging statute could be sustained under the Commerce Clause 
even if it violated the limited times provision of the Intellectual 
Property Clause.78  That court, however, avoided the question 
altogether by holding that the statute did not fall under the subject 
matter regulated under the mandate of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.79  This removed any possibility the statute circumvented 
the Constitution’s originality and limited times requirements 
because it was not subject to those requirements in the first place.  
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 78 Id. at 1171. 
 79 Id. at 1176. 
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Unfettered by a qualifying Intellectual Property, the court found 
the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause.80 
The court noted that: 
[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not 
fall within the purview of the [Intellectual Property] 
Clause, it need not consider whether it complies 
with the limitations of the [Intellectual Property] 
Clause.  To do so imports into the Commerce 
Clause limits that clause does not have.  That the 
Statute might provide “copyright-like” or 
“copyright-related” protection to matters clearly not 
covered by the [Intellectual Property] Clause is not 
important.  One need only find an alternative source 
of constitutional authority.81 
The court found the fact that the legislation was “copyright-
like” immaterial,82 and rather emphasized the fact that 
constitutional sources of authority are fungible.83  Like the court in 
Moghadam, the Kiss Catalog court avoids the tension between the 
Commerce and Copyright Clauses by finding no conflict at all.84  
Doing so avoids the question of whether the Intellectual Property 
Clause qualifies the exercise of Commerce Clause power when the 
exercise of that power results in copyright-like legislation. 
The broadest interpretation of Kiss Catalog would imply that 
subject matter that does not fall under the current application of the 
Intellectual Property Clause could be regulated under an alternative 
source of constitutional power.85  The difficulty of such an 
interpretation is that it becomes problematic if one assumes that 
Congress is not exercising the ceiling of its Intellectual Property 
Clause powers.  If Congress later decides to regulate subject matter 
it can but has not before regulated under the Intellectual Property 
Clause, what happens to existing Commerce Clause legislation on 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1175. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 84 Kiss Catalog, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 
1269, 1280). 
 85 See id. at 1176. 
BATHAEE_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:14:51 PM 
2008] A CONSTITUTIONAL IDEA-EXPRESSION DOCTRINE 457 
point?  A court following Kiss Catalog would eventually have to 
confront the question this court avoided—whether the narrower 
clause qualifies the more general. 
B. The Treaty Power 
Article II of the Constitution vests power in the executive to 
negotiate and sign treaties that receive the full force of United 
States law upon ratification by two-thirds of the Senate.86  The 
product of this power, when coupled with the Supremacy Clause,87 
receives preemptive force against the states.88  Thus, a treaty 
signed by the President and ratified by the Senate would not be 
differentiable in effect from a law passed through the traditional 
legislative process.89  Yet because such a law would be passed 
pursuant to an Article II power, the constraints of the Article I 
Intellectual Property Clause may not fully apply. 
Although a treaty cannot authorize what the Constitution does 
not allow,90 the line between what the Constitution prohibits and 
what it does not affirmatively permit is blurry at best.  Arguably 
 
86 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have the power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”). 
 87 Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (noting that treaties become the supreme law of the land upon 
ratification). 
 88 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (“When the national 
government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, 
privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme 
law of the land.  No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or 
statute.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“The treaties were 
of no greater legal obligation than the act of congress.  By the [C]onstitution, laws made 
in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are both 
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one 
over the other.”); Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (finding that a state law was preempted by an air carriage treaty). 
 89 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600. 
 90 See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (“The treaty-making power 
of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, 
though it does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,’ it does 
extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations.”); 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1924) (“The treaty in question does not 
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.  The only question is 
whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth 
Amendment.”). 
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constraints in Article I do not extend to treaties promulgated under 
Article II.91  If the Intellectual Property Clause does not prohibit 
copyright-like legislation that does not impose the constitutional 
constraints of the Clause, such as the limited times provision, 
under the authority of another constitutional power, a treaty that 
disposes of such a requirement would not conflict with the Article 
I provision.  And even if there is a conflict, it can be argued that 
the horizontal constraints in the Article I provisions do not carry 
over to an exercise of an Article II power.92  Such an argument, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Note.93 
C. The Spending Power 
Congress has broad powers to spend federal funds on state 
programs.94  This broad power can be used to condition the grant 
of federal funds on state compliance with federally imposed 
conditions and is subject to several constraints.  First, the condition 
on federal funds must be unambiguously stated.95  Second, the use 
of the federal funds must be for the “general welfare.”96  Third, the 
use of federal funds must relate to a federal program.97  Fourth, 
 
 91 See Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time?  
Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1079, 1113–17 (2006) (arguing that the horizontal limitations of Article I can be 
circumvented when Congress acts pursuant to its Article II power). 
 92 See id. 
 93 For an excellent discussion of the effect of the Article II treaty power on the Article I 
Intellectual Property Clause see generally id. at 1113–17. 
 94 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987). 
 95 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a 
contract—in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions.  The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power 
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
‘contract.’” (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–98 (1937); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980))). 
 96 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“The first of these limitations is derived from the 
language of the Constitution itself—the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit 
of ‘the general welfare.’” (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936))). 
 97 See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (“[The conditions 
must be] reasonably related to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs.”). 
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another provision of the Constitution may curtail the spending 
power.98 
One can easily conceive of a federal funding program that 
conditions federal funds on state implementation of a federal 
scheme of copyright-like protection.  The validity of these state 
laws would largely depend on whether the Intellectual Property 
Clause would qualify the spending power and whether the state 
law would be preempted by the federal copyright scheme. 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act requires that all state laws 
regulating the subject matter within the purview of the Copyright 
Act and that provide rights equivalent to those afforded by the Act 
must be preempted.99  A state law that regulates copyright-like 
subject matter would fall under the umbrella of subject matter 
typically regulated by the Copyright Act.100  If the statute did not 
protect distribution, copying, or derivative work rights that were 
 
 98 See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269–70 
(1985) (“Congress may impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, absent some 
independent constitutional bar.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); 
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968) (“There is of course no question that the 
Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may 
impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be 
disbursed, and that any state law or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and 
conditions is to that extent invalid.” (citing Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 
U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947))). 
 99 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to 
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come 
within the subject matter of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title.”); see 
also Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that only rights 
equivalent to those protected under the copyright act would be preempted); Data Gen. 
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Section 
301(a) precludes enforcement of any state cause of action which is equivalent in 
substance to a federal copyright infringement claim.”). 
 100 Works that would not receive federal copyright protection can still fall under the 
subject matter regulated by the copyright act. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 
F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter extends 
beyond the tangible expressions that can be protected under the Act to elements of 
expression which themselves cannot be protected.”); NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 
841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Section 301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims 
with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements.”). 
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equivalent to those afforded by § 106 of the Copyright Act, such a 
law would be valid.101 
That is, unless the four requirements of the Taxing and 
Spending Power test—which leave open the possibility that 
another clause in the Constitution could curtail congressional 
power102—would bar a condition on federal funds that would 
demand the implementation of a federal quasi-copyright scheme.  
The fourth requirement notes that another provision of the 
Constitution can constrain the spending power.  Thus, under the 
Taxing and Spending Power, a court would have to face the same 
issue it faces under Commerce Clause cases103—whether a law 
passed under an alternative legislative power could be used to 
circumvent the constraints of a narrower provision. 
D. Problems Arising from Protecting Works Within the Subject 
Matter of Copyright Under an Alternative Constitutional 
Power 
Regardless of which constitutional power is used as an 
alternative to the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, 
the validity of such an exercise of power would depend on the 
tradeoff made between applying the constraints of a narrow 
constitutional provision and a policy of allowing Congress to 
exercise their broader constitutional powers to effectuate an 
identical purpose without the same constraints.  Does the fact that a 
constitutional provision targets a specific type of subject matter 
make it the exclusive arbiter of that subject matter?  At the core of 
such determinations are important policy considerations.  Are the 
originality104 and “Limited Times”105 requirements embedded in 
the Intellectual Property Clause vital to the maintenance of a 
federal intellectual property protection scheme? 
 
 101 See supra note 99; see also § 301(b)(3).  Section 301(b)(3) is the mirror image of 
301(a), noting that laws that are not equivalent will not be preempted. Id. 
 102 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 103 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 104 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) 
(“Originality requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement 
independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), 
and that it display some minimal level of creativity.”). 
 105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The constitutional and judicially imposed requirements derived 
from the Intellectual Property Clause address themselves to two 
broader problems.  First, because American courts have interpreted 
the Intellectual Property Clause as allowing a division between 
patent and copyright law,106 maintaining the more stringent 
requirements for obtaining a patent depends on a wall of separation 
between the subject matter protected by copyright and patent 
laws.107  Otherwise, individuals will be faced with an incentive to 
forgo the intensive patent examination process in favor of the more 
lax requirements of copyright law.  Second, absent the 
requirements of originality, idea-expression, and fixation, there 
would be significant difficulty in defining the property right 
protected by federal copyright law. 
1. Enforcing the Asymmetrical Examination and Registration 
Processes of Copyright and Patent Law 
While copyright law has created a division between the 
protection of idea and expression,108 the patent law makes no such 
distinction.109  The idea-expression doctrine has become an 
axiomatic fixture of the federal scheme of copyright protection.110  
The most obvious function of this doctrine is to enforce the 
 
 106 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (“Further distinguishing the two 
kinds of intellectual property, copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge.  
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from 
her reading.  The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others of 
the inventor’s knowledge.”) (citation omitted); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (“On that account, we have often distinguished between 
the limited protection accorded a copyright owner and the extensive protection granted a 
patent owner.”). 
 107 See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103 (maintaining that a distinction between a 
stronger patent protection and a weaker copyright protection requires that the two bodies 
of law be kept distinct). 
 108 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 109 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”); see also Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434 (S.D. W. Va. 
2003) (“A patent is required to protect an idea isolated from any original expression.”). 
 110 See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (“It is 
an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyrightable work extends 
only to the particular expression of an idea and never to the idea itself.”). 
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separation between the subject matter protected by patents and 
copyrights.  Patents protect ideas and copyrights protect the 
expression of ideas.111  The government vests the patent property 
right under more stringent conditions,112 and copyright protection 
under a lax if not non-existent examination process.113 
Absent this separation, individuals could choose which type of 
property right they prefer.  Although protection of patents are quite 
different than the protections afforded under the copyright laws in 
that copyright protection does not extend to ideas,114 individuals 
weighing the benefits of protection against the substantial cost of 
the patent examination and prosecution process may chose to 
employ the copyright laws rather than the patent laws if both the 
patent and the copyright schemes protected ideas.  Given the 
ability to protect the underlying idea of a work, the Copyright Act 
could be used to create government sanctioned monopolies not too 
different in effect from a patent.  In other words, if given the 
choice between a long, onerous, and costly patent examination 
process and the lax registration requirements for enforcing 
copyrights in court, there is little incentive to choose the 
intellectual property right that is more difficult to obtain. 
Legislation under an alternative grant of congressional power 
would pose the same problem posed by removing the wall of 
separation between idea and expression in copyright.  If the idea-
expression doctrine is not incorporated into the alternative grant of 
power, individuals will be faced with the aforementioned incentive 
to subvert the stringent requirements of the patent laws by seeking 
the protection of ideas under an alternative copyright-like statute. 
 
 111 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no 
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the 
idea—not the idea itself.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing the idea-expression dichotomy in terms of the 
division between patent and copyright protection). 
 112 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215 (“[D]esign patents require the critical examination given 
patents to protect the public against monopoly.”). 
 113 While registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright, see 17 
U.S.C. § 410(c), registration does not require a thorough examination process. 
 114 See id. § 102(b). 
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2. Difficulties in Defining the Property Right 
Many of the judicial doctrines in copyright law serve the 
objective of protecting the intangible.115  Intellectual property 
rights are, to some extent, a legal fiction.116  The law vests property 
rights in the intangible.  The material world does not provide the 
traditional metes and bounds to products of the mind as it does to 
property composed of matter.  It falls upon the law to serve the 
function of defining to what extent a property right vests in such 
works. 
The fixation requirement reduces the intractable problem of 
protecting something that exists only in the mind.  By requiring 
works to be expressed in a tangible and permanent medium prior to 
being protected,117 the fixation requirement reinforces the barrier 
between idea and expression at the core of copyright protection.118  
A work cannot be protected until it is expressed and works that 
exist only in the mind receive no special treatment. 
Absent a requirement that works be fixed, courts will have to 
grapple with the metaphysical question of defining the limits of a 
property right that has no permanent physical manifestation.  
While an unauthorized recording of a live musical performance, 
 
 115 See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11 (1908) (“Musical 
compositions mentioned as the subject of copyright are tangible and legible embodiments 
of the intellectual product of the musician, and not the intangible intellectual product 
itself.”); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984) (“We hold 
that the intangible idea protected by the copyright is effectively made tangible by its 
embodiment upon the [medium].”). 
 116 Report, American Bar Association Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, Achieving 
Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues 
Created by the Internet, 55 BUS. LAW. 1801, 1899 (“All intellectual property interests are 
intangible, and legal fictions are used to localize these interests.”). 
 117 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l., Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 
873–74 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The fixation requirement is defined in section 101 in relevant 
part as follows: A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”). 
 118 For example, the inability to mark off the metes and bounds of speech during an 
interview with Ernest Hemingway prevented a court deciding whether to protect the 
contents of the interview from granting a common law copyright.  This was largely due to 
a lack of fixation. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346 
(1968). 
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for example, may give rise to liability, it is unclear where liability 
stops.  What constitutes a live performance?  When does the 
performance end?  Is the author entitled to a sequence of three 
repetitive notes performed live?  Many of the answers that one 
naturally provides to solve these problems stem from the rich 
doctrine developed in copyright law.  For example, the repetitive 
notes may invoke the merger doctrine.  Yet when Congress enacts 
legislation pursuant to its commerce power, do these doctrines 
come with such legislation? 
The next section will discuss an important doctrine of 
copyright law—the idea-expression doctrine.  This doctrine is the 
encapsulating term for the notion that copyright protects 
expression not ideas and the facilitating corollary doctrines of fair 
use and merger.  After discussing the origins, purpose, and 
facilitating doctrines of the idea-expression doctrine, this Note will 
again pose the question of what effect copyright doctrines have on 
legislation promulgated pursuant to an alternative grant of 
constitutional power.  This Note will argue that the doctrine of 
idea-expression and its corollaries are constitutional requirements 
that must constrain any alternative constitutional power when used 
to pass copyright-like legislation. 
III. THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND ITS COROLLARY 
DOCTRINES: FACILITATING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Apart from the doctrine’s most obvious application—
maintaining the separation between patent and copyright 
protection—the doctrine delineates the scope of intellectual 
property rights through several corollary doctrines.  The Fair Use 
doctrine, for example, allows some flexibility in the property right 
to ensure that others can build on the ideas that protected 
expression is predicated on.119  Part of the primary function of the 
Fair Use doctrine is not only to provide access to the underlying 
ideas of a work, but also to keep idea and expression separate from 
 
119  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (“[T]he ‘fair use’ defense allows 
the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also 
expression itself in certain circumstances.”). 
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each other.120  It allows individuals to distinguish idea from 
expression and to determine at what point private rights end and 
the public domain begins.121 
Likewise, the judicially created conceptual separability tests 
also enforce the line between idea and expression.  Coupled with 
the Merger Doctrine, courts ensure that underlying ideas are easily 
accessible to the public by preventing the protection of works in 
which expression and ideas are indistinguishable from one another.  
This section will explore the origins of the idea-expression 
doctrine along with its modern applications through various 
judicially created doctrines.  This section will also look at specific 
examples in which idea and expression typically run a high risk of 
merger, such as in computer software and functional art.  The 
doctrine is not only a judicially created policy, but also the 
cornerstone of maintaining intellectual property rights without 
compromising the public benefit for which such rights were 
created in the first place. 
A. The Pragmatic Genesis of the Idea-Expression Distinction 
The early distinction between idea and expression was 
premised on the intangibility of ideas.  Since one cannot divine 
what exists in another’s mind, ideas cannot be protected until they 
are expressed.122  The difficulty lies in establishing the metes and 
bounds of a property right that exists solely in the mind and in the 
little use such an embodiment of an idea would have to the 
cumulative creation of new works.123 
 
120  See id. at 219 (“[Fair Use] distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes 
only the latter eligible for copyright protection.”). 
121 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“[Reverse engineering fair use allows users] to distinguish the protected from the 
unprotected elements of [a computer program].”). 
 122 See infra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Clayton v. Stone & Hall, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872) 
(“The term ‘science’ cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating 
and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price-current, the subject-matter of which is 
daily changing, and is of mere temporary use.”).  Courts attempting to fix common law 
copyright protection in unfixed works have struggled with defining the property right.  
The New York Court of Appeals considered a claim by the estate of Ernest Hemingway 
seeking to protect Hemingway’s utterances during an interview under a theory of 
common law copyright. See Estate of Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 346 (1968).  That court 
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Early courts that decided whether the ideas underlying works 
are copyrightable examined the approach taken by English courts 
interpreting the Statute of Anne.124  The Supreme Court in Holmes 
v. Hurst125 quoted Justice Erle in Jefferys v. Boosey in defining the 
property right vested by the copyright laws and noted that “[t]he 
subject of property is the order of words in the author’s 
composition, not the words themselves . . . nor the ideas expressed 
by those words, they existing in the mind alone, which is not 
capable of appropriation.”126 
A second difficulty that gave rise to the distinction between 
idea and expression is the possibility of protecting both the 
expressive and utilitarian elements of a copyrighted work.  The 
origin of the doctrine is largely attributable to the seminal Supreme 
Court Case of Baker v. Selden.127  In that case the Court decided 
whether a book that included forms for a method of bookkeeping 
were protected under the copyright laws.128  The Supreme Court 
held that the forms were not protected because doing so may result 
in protecting the method of accounting concomitant with using the 
forms to record financial data.129 
Although the Court did not do so explicitly, it implicitly 
announced a distinction between ideas and the expression of ideas.  
The Court noted that the illustrations in the book describing the 
method of bookkeeping: 
are the mere language employed by the author to 
convey his ideas more clearly.  Had he used words 
of description instead of diagrams (which merely 
 
stated that “[a]ssuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law copyright 
in certain limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very 
least, be required that the speaker indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in 
question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique 
statement and that he wished to exercise control over its publication.” Id. at 349. 
 124 See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85–86 (1899); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 
Pet.) 591, 595 (1834); Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591, 593 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Myers v. Callaghan, 5 F. 726, 732 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881); Lawrence 
v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 34 (C.C. D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). 
 125 Holmes, 174 U.S. 82. 
 126 Id. at 86 (quoting Jefferys v. Boosey, (1854) 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702 (H.L.)). 
 127 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 128 Id. at 100–01. 
 129 Id. at 107. 
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stand in the place of words), there could not be the 
slightest doubt that others, applying the art to 
practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and 
diagrams which were in the author’s mind, and 
which he thus described by words in his book.130 
The Court further noted that given the purpose of the copyright 
laws—to spur the creation of new works based on old ideas—
protecting the system of bookkeeping described in the book would 
mean that “knowledge could not be used without incurring the 
guilt of piracy of the book.”131  The book would protect not just the 
expressive description of the method of bookkeeping but the 
method itself.132 
The fundamental risk in protecting the utility of the work is 
that such protection would lock up the ideas underlying the method 
of bookkeeping because the method of bookkeeping—the process 
itself—is the underlying idea of the work.  Accordingly, the Baker 
Court noted: 
The description of the art in a book, though entitled 
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an 
exclusive claim to the art itself.  The object of the 
one is explanation; the object of the other is use.  
The former may be secured by copyright.  The latter 
can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by 
letters-patent.133 
Thus, the difficulty in divorcing the idea behind a utilitarian work 
from the utility of the work gave rise to a distinction between the 
protections of the patent and copyright laws. 
The distinction between idea and expression arose because of 
two problems inherent in protecting ideas.  First, because an idea is 
intangible and unexpressed, the contours of a property right in 
ideas would be amorphously defined.  Second, in works straddling 
the line between being utilitarian and expressive, protecting the 
utilitarian aspects of the work would mean possibly protecting the 
 
 130 Id. at 103. 
 131 Id. at 103–04. 
 132 Id. at 103–04. 
 133 Id. at 105. 
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ideas intertwined with the utility of the work.  The purpose of 
making the distinction is one of necessity; absent such a distinction 
the property right would not take concrete form. 
B. The Modern Application of the Idea-Expression Doctrine and 
Its Corollaries 
The judicially created doctrine has given rise to codification in 
§ 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.134  That provision states that 
“[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”135 
The idea-expression dichotomy embodies the premise that 
“[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art 
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—
not the idea itself.”136  This doctrine has been applied in several 
situations, primarily when either protecting the expression would 
potentially protect the underlying ideas of the work or when a 
work is so intertwined with the underlying ideas that the two 
cannot be distinguished.137 
Two types of works are problematic when distinguishing 
between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas.  First, 
functional art tends to blur the lines between idea and expression 
because the artistic features of a work may also serve some 
functional purpose.138  Second, software—in its most expressive 
 
134 See H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 57 (“Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the 
scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the 
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between 
expression and idea remains unchanged.”). 
 135 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 136 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954) (citations omitted). 
 137 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (stating that 
a compilation of facts in a directory lacks originality); Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (stating that 
a copyright on a work of mathematical science cannot give an exclusive right over the 
methods of operation or the diagrams used to explain those methods). 
 138 See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff’d, 205 F.2d 633 
(9th Cir. 1953) (addressing the issue of whether a registered sculpture is utilitarian in 
purpose and character). 
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form being written in a computer language and in its most 
utilitarian form no more than a series of machine instructions—
tends to straddle the line between a method of operation and an 
expressive literary work.139 
This section will examine the application of the idea-
expression doctrine within the context of computer software and 
utilitarian works of art.  Moreover, this section will also discuss 
two doctrinal corollaries to the idea-expression doctrine, the 
Merger and Fair Use Doctrines. 
1. The Line Between Utility and Expression in  
Computer Software 
The idea-expression dichotomy has given rise to extensive 
litigation over copyright protection of the non-literal elements of 
software.140  Computer software, being no more than a series of 
computer instructions, can be viewed as indistinguishable from a 
recipe141 or, as the styled by the statute, “a method of operation.”142  
 
 139 See Pamela Samuelson et. al, Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2351 (1994) (noting that § 102(b) 
precludes copyrighting of methods of operation, but program behavior can by 
copyrightable when it is expressive). 
 140 Jack George Abid, Software Patents On Both Sides Of The Atlantic, 23 J. MARSHALL 
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 815, 822 (2005) (“With copyright protection for software well 
established, software firms, especially in the U.S., began to seek broader intellectual 
property protection for their software by filing copyright infringement suits alleging non-
literal infringement against competing firms using questionable tactics.”); Jacob A. 
Gantz, [Private] Order[ing] in the Court?: How the Circuit Courts Should Resolve the 
Current Conflict Over Reverse Engineering Clauses in Mass Market Licenses, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 999, 1004 (2005) (“After Apple, a ‘second generation’ of cases arose that 
challenged the limits of protection afforded to computer software.” (quoting ROBERT P. 
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 872 (Aspen 
3d ed. 2003))). 
 141 Some courts have chosen to protect, although not directly, recipes. See Fargo 
Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1924) (“[Recipes] are 
not a mere advertisement; they are original compositions, and serve a useful purpose, 
apart from the mere advertisement of the article itself.  They serve to advance the 
culinary art.”).  Yet, most courts do not protect recipes unless the author elaborates on the 
recipe. See Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The 
recipes involved in this case comprise the lists of required ingredients and the directions 
for combining them to achieve the final products.  The recipes contain no expressive 
elaboration upon either of these functional components, as opposed to recipes that might 
spice up functional directives by weaving in creative narrative.  We do not express any 
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Yet, courts have long since protected software as literary works 
since the source code and object code often express the ideas 
underlying what the program ultimately accomplishes.143 
A program, being a functionally driven work, is often difficult 
to parse for idea and expression.144  Courts have been faced with a 
choice either to protect only the literal elements of the work, such 
as the instructions or computer language expression, or to protect 
the non-literal elements just as courts protect the plot of a novel or 
other literary work.145  Courts have chosen to walk the fine line of 
protecting both literal and non-literal elements of source code, but 
only to the extent that they are expressive and do not embody the 
underlying ideas of the code.146 
The most prominent debate over the protection of non-literal 
elements of source code is whether the structure, sequence, and 
organization of a computer program can be protected.147  On one 
hand, the true value in source code is the organizational approach 
taken by the author, simply because one method of writing a 
 
opinion whether recipes are or are not per se amenable to copyright protection, for it 
would be inappropriate to do so.”). 
 142 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
143 Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476–77 (9th Cir.1992) 
(“[A]t least some computer programs bear significant similarities to literary works.”); 
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that the 
copyright act treats software as literary works.”). 
 144 See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“Determining which elements of a program are protectable is a difficult task.”); see also 
Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application 
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1989) (“Computer software, by its very nature 
as written work intended to serve utilitarian purposes, defies easy categorization within 
our intellectual property system.”). 
 145 Menell, supra note 144, at 1046 (noting the emergence of  copyright infringement 
suits involving non-literal forms of copying). 
 146 Id. at 1049. 
 147 Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (protecting structure, sequence, and organization), with Computer Assocs. 
Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544, 560–61 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 982 F.2d 693 
(2d Cir. 1992) (holding that such protection would be too broad).  The United States 
Copyright Office does not register works based solely on the structure, sequence, and 
organization of a computer program. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for 
Computer Programs (Circular 61), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2007). 
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program may be more efficient than another that accomplishes the 
same functional task.148 
This is particularly true in the realm of object-oriented 
programming,149 which requires programmers to create a hierarchy 
of objects or data structures.150  Object-oriented programming 
allows a programmer to define an object,151 for example a cat, give 
the object properties inherent in all cats, and when the programmer 
wants to create a narrower version of such an object, such as a lion, 
she would avoid reinventing the wheel152 by inheriting a new 
object “lion” as a kind of  “cat.”  The hierarchy created by the 
programmer may warrant protection, although such a hierarchy is 
not explicit in the code. 
Even in sequential programming models, there is essentially 
some ingenuity in between the lines.  Instructions are grouped into 
subroutines, and subroutines are executed in a particular order, 
giving rise to an ultimate functional effect. 
Moreover, there is the problem of abstraction that exists in 
virtually any literary work.153  Just as a Shakespearian sonnet can 
be characterized as an aggregation of characters, an aggregation of 
words, an aggregation of sentences, or the overarching structure of 
iambic pentameter, so too can computer software be characterized 
in myriad different ways.  Yet, there is a problem unique to 
 
 148 See Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting 
that efficiency concerns may narrow the universe of ways individuals can write a 
computer subroutine). 
 149 For an excellent discussion about object oriented programming, see Jacqueline D. 
Lipton, IP’s Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software Protection, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 205, 228–29 (2006). 
 150 See id. at 228. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. at 229. 
 153 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (L. Hand, J.) (“Upon any 
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will 
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might 
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no 
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas’, to 
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.” (citing Holmes v. 
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899))); see also Michael D. Murray Copyright, Originality, and 
the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 779, 791–93 (2006) (discussing the Nichols case). 
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computer programs.  The lower the level of abstraction, the more 
computer software approaches becoming no more than a method or 
system of operation.154 
The Third Circuit first dealt with this problem by applying a 
broad rule expansively protecting the non-literal elements of code.  
That court in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental 
Laboratories, Inc.,155 addressed the question of whether a program 
created by translating a program written in one programming 
language into another could be an infringement of the original 
work.156  In essence, the court had to decide whether the 
underlying structure of the code was protected or whether only the 
literal elements of the code were protected.157 
In holding that copyright law protected the organization of the 
computer program the court reasoned: 
As the program structure is refined, the programmer 
must make decisions about what data are needed, 
where along the program’s operations the data 
should be introduced, how the data should be 
inputted, and how it should be combined with other 
data.  The arrangement of the data is accomplished 
by means of data files . . . and is affected by the 
details of the program’s subroutines and modules, 
for different arrangements of subroutines and 
modules may require data in different forms.  Once 
again, there are numerous ways the programmer can 
solve the data-organization problems she or he 
 
154 Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994) (“But as 
one moves away from the literal code to more general levels of a program, it becomes 
more difficult to distinguish between unprotectible ideas, processes, methods or 
functions, on one hand, and copyrightable expression on the other.”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (“Drawing the line too 
liberally in favor of copyright protection would bestow strong monopolies over specific 
applications upon the first to write programs performing those applications and would 
thereby inhibit other creators from developing improved products. Drawing the line too 
conservatively would allow programmer’s efforts to be copied easily, thus discouraging 
the creation of all but modest incremental advances.”) (quoting Menell, Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1047–48 (1989)).  
 155 797 F.2d. 1222 (1986). 
 156 Id. at 1224. 
 157 Id. 
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faces.  Each solution may have particular 
characteristics—efficiencies or inefficiencies, 
conveniences or quirks—that differentiate it from 
other solutions and make the overall program more 
or less desirable.158 
The Third Circuit thus implicitly noted that the ultimate choice 
in the mode of dealing with the data-organization problems posed 
by a programming task were in effect the valuable aspects of a 
computer program.159  The court emphasized the comparative 
value of the structure of a program in comparison to the value of 
the actual coding by noting that “the coding process is a 
comparatively small part of programming.”160 
The Whelan court chose to protect non-literal elements because 
other types of literary works can be infringed upon even though 
there is no literal copying of the original work.161  Since computer 
programs have been interpreted to be literary works162 the same 
reasoning should therefore apply.  The court thus articulated the 
following test: 
 
 158 Id. at 1230. 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. at 1231. 
 161 Id. at 1234  (“The copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when 
there is no substantial similarity between the works’ literal elements.”); Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting 
similarities in the plots of two different literary works); Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that copyright must protect against 
immaterial variations on literal elements). 
 162 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 885 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that software is protected 
as a literary work under the 1976 Act); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 
870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A] computer program can be the subject of a copyright as a 
literary text.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 
(3d Cir. 1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“Written computer programs are copyrightable as literary works.”); Corsearch, Inc. v. 
Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 322 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that 
definition of a literary work includes databases); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 
(1976) (“[The definition of literary work] includes computer data bases and computer 
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of 
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.”); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 50–
51 (1975). 
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[T]he line between idea and expression may be 
drawn with reference to the end sought to be 
achieved by the work in question.  In other words, 
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would 
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not 
necessary to that purpose or function would be part 
of the expression of the idea.  Where there are 
various means of achieving the desired purpose, 
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to 
the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.163 
Conflating computer programs with other literary works, 
however, proved dangerous.  Protecting computer programs as 
literary works could result in simultaneously protecting the 
underlying method of operation or idea.  This heightened risk of 
overprotecting computer programs may counsel against a more 
cautious protection.  Soon after Whelan, courts began to question 
the Third Circuit’s reasoning.164  Among the most prominent 
criticisms of the Whelan decision was that the Whelan rule of 
protecting the structure, sequence, and organization of a computer 
program implicitly assumed that idea could always be separated 
from expression in computer programs, allowing a court to protect 
only the portions of a computer program that warrant copyright 
protection.  In quoting Professor Nimmer’s treatise, the court in 
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc. stated that “‘[t]he 
crucial flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ 
 
 163 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (citation omitted). 
 164 See CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (1992) (“The sheer 
simplicity of the Third Circuit’s idea/expression analysis tempts the Court to adopt its 
test.  Unfortunately, the simplicity that makes the test so attractive, also makes it 
conceptually overbroad and descriptively inadequate.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560–61  
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Whelan, therefore, is 
fundamentally flawed . . . by failing to distinguish between the static and dynamic views 
of a program.”); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT,§ 13.03[F][1] (2006) [hereinafter “NIMMER”] (“The crucial flaw in this 
reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ in copyright law terms, underlies any 
computer program, and that once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must 
be expression.”); Steven R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: 
Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of The Structure of Computer Programs, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 882 (1990). 
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in copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that 
once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be 
expression.’”165  Applying the structure, sequence, and 
organization test in Whelan could thus overprotect works such that 
copyright protection would extend to unprotectable ideas 
underlying a work. 
The debate over the scope of protection to be afforded the non-
literal elements of computer programs illustrates the intertwined 
nature of idea and expression in utilitarian works.  The Altai court 
clearly noted the problem specifically inherent to computer 
programs: 
[A] computer program is made up of sub-programs 
and sub-sub-programs, and so on.  Each of those 
programs and sub-programs has at least one idea.  
Some of them could be separately copyrightable; 
but many of them are so standard or routine in the 
computer field as to be almost automatic statements 
or instructions written into a program.166 
The Altai court attributed the difficulty in deciding the scope of 
protection to the same abstraction problem that Judge Learned 
Hand noted in the Nichols case. 
Thus, one of the principle roles of the idea-expression doctrine 
is to police the line between the protected expression and 
unprotected utility that inherently exists when the Copyright Act 
protects computer programs.  Moreover, whether and to what 
extent a computer program is protected by the Copyright Act 
directly depends on how the line between idea and expression is 
drawn. 
 
 165 Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 559 (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 13.03[F][1]). 
 166 Id. at 559.  The Altai court further noted a distinction between text and behavior.  
Quoting the testimony of an expert witness, the Altai court noted that “there is no 
necessary relationship between the sequence of operations in a program, which are part of 
behavior, and the order or sequence in which those operations are set forth in the text of 
the program—the source code and object code . . . . [T]he order in which sub-routines 
appear in the program text is utterly irrelevant, and the two views of a computer program, 
as text and as behavior, are quite distinct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
BATHAEE_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:14:51 PM 
476 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
2. Conceptual Separability 
The Copyright Act protects works of applied art.  Yet, such 
works embody both artistic expression and utilitarian function.  
Federal courts have struggled with the task of determining to what 
extent such works are protected under the Copyright Act.  In doing 
so, courts have attempted to separate the expressive elements of 
utilitarian art from the utilitarian elements in accord with the 
definition of a “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural work[]” under § 
101 of the Copyright Act.167 
The current version of the statute codifies the holding in Mazer 
v. Stein.168  That Court confronted a work that was both a statue 
and a table lamp.169  The Court noted that “[w]e find nothing in the 
copyright statute to support the argument that the intended use or 
use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or 
invalidates its registration.  We do not read such a limitation into 
the copyright law.”170  The Supreme Court thus allowed the 
protection of works that are at once utilitarian and expressive. 
With the idea-expression dichotomy still in place, the 
fundamental challenge in endorsing the holding in Mazer is 
 
 167 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the 
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). 
 168 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).  The house report notes that the bill affirms the 
ruling in Mazer. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 105 (1976); see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. 
Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987); Kieselstein-Cord v. 
Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1980); Davis v. United Artists, 
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 726 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Beth F. Dumas, The Functionality 
Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 
12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 471, 473 n.17 (1990) (After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mazer v. Stein, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1979) codified the holding, and it can 
be argued that the statute adopts the regulation’s rule.  The provision promulgated the 
following rule—(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the 
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.  However, if 
the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, 
or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing 
independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.”) 
 169 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202–03. 
 170 Id. at 218. 
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protecting the expressive component of such works while leaving 
the underlying utility to the public domain or to the law of patents.  
The standard to be used when policing the line between utility and 
art has given rise to a broader debate over whether a work is 
“conceptually separable.”171 
The principle case giving rise to the distinction between works 
of art that are and are not conceptually separable is the Second 
Circuit opinion in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,172 
in which that court determined whether decorative belt buckles 
were copyrightable subject matter.173  Noting that the buckles 
possessed ornamental elements that are conceptually separable 
from the utilitarian function of the belt,174 the Second Circuit 
particularly cited the use of the buckles on other parts of the body 
besides the waist.175  The court then compared such a product to 
jewelry,176 which at the time had been protected under copyright 
law.177  In protecting the belt buckles by denying summary 
judgment on the copyrightability issue, the Kieselstein-Cord court 
endorsed a rule that interpreted the Copyright Act’s protections to 
“extend only to ornamental or superfluous designs contained 
within useful objects while denying [such protections] to 
artistically designed functional components of useful objects.”178 
 
 171 The House Report to the 1976 Act notes that separability can be either physical or 
conceptual. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976); Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993 
(noting that the legislative history allows either physical or conceptual seperability as a 
condition for protection). 
 172 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 989. 
 173 Id. at 990–91. 
 174 Id. at 993. 
 175 Id. (“We see in appellant’s belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements, 
as apparently have the buckles’ wearers who have used them as ornamentation for parts 
of the body other than the waist.”). 
 176 Id. 
 177 The Kieselstein-Cord court cited three cases for this proposition: Boucher v. Du 
Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that costume jewelry, particularly 
earrings were within the subject of the statute); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert Zentall, 
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 510, 511–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (protecting a pendent rendering a t-
shirt); and Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 552–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (protecting what plaintiff in that case characterized as “junk jewelry,” or 
costume jewelry). 
 178 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 996. 
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The decision to protect works that are conceptually or 
physically separable has given rise to several fragmented tests.  
One such test emerged when the Second Circuit revisited its 
holding in Kieselstein-Cord in 1985 in the case of Carol Barnhart 
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.179  Instead of overruling the decision, 
that court distinguished the case on the grounds that the ornamental 
components of the torso mannequins in that case were necessary to 
the utility of the work.180  The Carol Barnhart court observed that 
the ornamental elements of the torso mannequins were 
“inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of 
clothes.”181 
Judge Newman, dissenting in Carol-Barnhart, articulated 
another test for conceptual separability that inquired whether “the 
article . . . stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is 
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”182  
Commentators have referred to this test as the “temporal 
displacement” test.183 
Yet another test emerged from Professor Robert C. Denicola’s 
famous article,184 which attempted to create a clearer test for 
conceptual separability.185  In seeking a workable rule, Professor 
Denicola made an important concession about the endeavor and 
noted that “[i]n truth, of course, there is no line, but merely a 
spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees to 
utilitarian concerns.”186  Setting criteria for a more ideal test, 
 
 179 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 180 Id. at 419. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 183 See WILLIAM PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 43–45 (6th ed. 1986); Eric 
Setliff, Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 58 (2006); see also John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright Line 
Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual 
Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 313 (2005); Dana 
Beldiman, Protecting The Form But Not The Function: Is U.S. Law Ready For A New 
Model?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 545 (2004); Richard G. 
Frenkel, Intellectual Property In The Balance: Proposals For Improving Industrial 
Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531, 549 (1999). 
 184 Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). 
 185 Id. at 741. 
 186 Id. 
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Professor Denicola noted that “[o]nly a model appealing directly to 
the considerations underlying the separability standard can avoid 
purely arbitrary distinctions.”187 
The Second Circuit, in the 1987 of Brandir International, Inc., 
v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,188 restated Professor Denicola’s 
test as requiring that when “design elements reflect a merger of 
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a 
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements.  Conversely, where design elements can be 
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability 
exists.”189 
The several tests that have emerged to determine the issue of 
conceptual separability illustrate the difficulty in policing the line 
between utilitarian function and artistic expression.  By 
maintaining a distinction between a work’s utilitarian function and 
its artistic elements, courts ensure that authors cannot protect 
utility under the guise of copyright, and in turn circumvent the 
thorough examination process required to obtain patent 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 189 Id. at 1145.  The Brandir court noted that the Denicola test had several benefits: 
First, the approach is consistent with the holdings of our previous 
cases.  In Kieselstein-Cord, for example, the artistic aspects of the 
belt buckles reflected purely aesthetic choices, independent of the 
buckles’ function, while in Carol Barnhart the distinctive features 
of the torsos—the accurate anatomical design and the sculpted shirts 
and collars—showed clearly the influence of functional concerns.  
Though the torsos bore artistic features, it was evident that the 
designer incorporated those features to further the usefulness of the 
torsos as mannequins.  Second, the test’s emphasis on the influence 
of utilitarian concerns in the design process may help, as Denicola 
notes, to alleviate the de facto discrimination against 
nonrepresentational art that has regrettably accompanied much of 
the current analysis.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we 
think Denicola’s test will not be too difficult to administer in 
practice.  The work itself will continue to give mute testimony of its 
origins.  In addition, the parties will be required to present evidence 
relating to the design process and the nature of the work, with the 
trier of fact making the determination whether the aesthetic design 
elements are significantly influenced by functional considerations. 
Id. at 1145–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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protection.190  This analytical process may not be required if the 
idea-expression dichotomy is not a constitutional restraint on 
copyright-like protection, this in turn will allow authors to 
undermine the patent laws by taking advantage of legislation 
passed under a different constitutionally enumerated power. 
 
3. Contracting Protection When Idea and Expression Merge 
The expression of a complex idea may take infinitely distinct 
shapes, yet the expression of a simple idea can often easily be 
enumerated and finite.  Protecting the few ways to express an idea 
would essentially create a monopoly in the idea in favor of 
whoever copyrights every permutation of the idea’s expression 
first.191  For example, protecting the phrase “have a nice day” may 
preclude another author from using the phrase “have a good day.”  
More clever individuals can simply seek protection of both phrases 
and monopolize the idea underlying the salutation. 
The idea-expression doctrine has given rise to a corollary 
doctrine called the “merger doctrine.”192  This doctrine ensures that 
when idea and expression merge neither can be expansively 
protected under copyright.193  At the base of the doctrine is the 
assumption that copyright protection in such cases would allow 
monopolization of ideas without having to undergo patent 
examination,194 and when the work is not patentable, the doctrine 
prevents the impermissible protection of ideas.195 
 
 190 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954) (noting the plaintiff’s argument that 
protecting the utilitarian work, in that case the table lamp, would undermine the extensive 
patent examination process and prevent the monopolization of the utility of the work). 
 191 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(“The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance 
between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.  What is 
basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner’s monopoly—from how large an 
area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?”). 
 192 See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing 
idea-expression and merger as close cousins). 
 193 See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (“The doctrine holds that when the expression of an idea is inseparable from 
the idea itself, the expression and idea merge.”). 
 194 Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (“When the idea and its expression are thus inseparable, 
copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in such 
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The doctrine has been applied to myriad cases, including 
notable cases involving jewelry,196 computer software,197 sports 
statistics,198 maps,199 and sweepstakes rules.200  The constant 
among all of these cases is that the protection of expression is 
tantamount to protecting ideas.  For example, in Southco, Inc. v. 
Kanebridge Corp.,201 the Third Circuit considered whether a 
numbering system developed to identify and market screws can be 
protected under the Copyright Act.202  A series of numbers were 
used to encode the attributes of a particular screw.203  For instance, 
 
circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the 
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 195 See CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“It is also well established that, in order to protect the immunity of ideas from 
private ownership, when the expression is essential to the statement of the idea, the 
expression also will be unprotected, so as to insure free public access to the discussion of 
the idea.”); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The 
fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea and not the idea itself 
is protectable has produced a corollary maxim that even expression is not protected in 
those instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that 
protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.”) 
(citations omitted); Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“When the idea and the expression of the idea coincide, then the expression will not be 
protected in order to prevent creation of a monopoly on the underlying art.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 196 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (jewel encrusted turtle pin); Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 738 (jewel encrusted bee 
pin); Behnam Jewelry Corp. v. Aron Basha Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078, 1093 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (baby shoe pendant). 
 197 See Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 
1983) (rejecting the application of the doctrine to operating system attributes that 
prevented the cloning of Apple computers). 
 198 See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 700. 
 199 See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 
(5th Cir. 1990) (applying the doctrine to a map indicating the location of a pipeline). 
 200 See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) (applying 
the doctrine to contest rules and finding that the rules were so simple that idea and 
expression had merged). 
 201 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 202 Id. at 277–78. 
 203 Id. (“Southco has referred to one of the numbers at issue in this case, part number 47-
10-202-10, to show how the system works.  The first two digits (47) show that the part 
falls within a class of captive screws.  Other digits indicate characteristics such as thread 
size (632), composition of the screw (aluminum), and finish of the knob (knurled).”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the first two digits could indicate the thread size of the screw.204  
The nine digit number in that case had 109 different 
permutations.205  Yet only a small subset of the possible 
combinations would have made any sense to a contractor choosing 
a screw.206  The sequence could thus be viewed as a series of 
numbers or a method of encoding.207  The court chose not to 
protect the sequence of numbers.208  The result of doing otherwise 
is readily apparent.  Protecting the sequence as a sequence of 
integers would allow individuals to register all 109 permutations, or 
more feasibly, the subset of valid permutations.  If, however, the 
court decided that the sequence was protected as a method of 
encoding, it would have protected a method of operation, which 
copyright law is bound not to protect.209 
The facts of the Southco case illustrate two principle functions 
of the merger doctrine.  First, the doctrine applies to short works 
expressing simpler ideas and precludes the monopolization of idea 
through the protection of expression.  Although the court in 
Southco did not rest its decision on merger grounds, the doctrine 
prevented the numbering system from being monopolized by 
simply copyrighting every valid permutation of the nine-digit 
 
 204 Id. 
 205 This number is the product of the number of possible numbers that can occupy each 
of the available spaces in the sequence.  In this case there are ten different digits that can 
occupy each of the nine spaces. 
 206 This is because the method of encoding imposes some constraints on what can 
constitute a valid sequence of numbers.  To be sure, Southco probably doesn’t 
manufacture a 1 m screw with 1 mm thread.  If Southco makes only twenty types of 
screws, only twenty of the number sequences can be valid. 
 207 Southco, 390 F.3d at 289–90 (“Put differently, the problem in this case is whether the 
Southco part numbers are words, short phrases, names or titles, or whether they are 
instead a compilation of data, a system of classification, or something else.  Indeed, the 
part numbers seem to fall into the gray area between a short phrase and a more extensive 
work.”). 
 208 Id. at 287. 
 209 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  The Eighth Circuit confronted a part numbering 
system similar to the one in Southco and held that the merger doctrine was inapplicable. 
See Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We do not 
believe that the idea of a parts numbering system is susceptible of only a very limited 
number of expressions.  Such systems will vary in complexity and composition as the 
type of information attempted to be encoded into the designation and the method of 
encoding varies.  Granting a particular company a copyright in its own system or systems 
would not necessarily monopolize the idea of a parts numbering system.”). 
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sequence.  Second, the doctrine ensures that seeking protection of 
the expression cannot protect methods of encoding for which short 
expression is often shorthand.  Serial numbers, for example, often 
encode information about the product.  The sequence of numbers 
may embody an unsophisticated encoding scheme—such as a 
numbering of produced products—or the sequence may embody a 
more complex system like the screws in Southco.  Both systems, 
however, are prevented from receiving expansive protection by 
virtue of the merger doctrine. 
The merger doctrine thus assists in maintaining the amorphous 
line between idea and expression.  Absent the existence of this 
doctrine, short phrases could be removed from the public lexicon 
and methods of encoding could be protected without going to the 
trouble of seeking patent protection.  The merger doctrine is thus a 
necessary corollary of maintaining a distinction between idea and 
expression. 
 
4. The Doctrine of Fair Use: Policing the Boundaries of Idea 
and Expression 
A complementary doctrine to the idea-expression doctrine is 
the doctrine of fair use, which congress codified in § 107 of the 
Copyright Act.210  That provision provides that “[n]otwithstanding 
the provisions of sections 106 . . . the fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”211  
The fair use defense can be characterized as both an affirmative 
defense and as an exception to the statutory property right created 
by federal copyright law. 
When considering whether a use is fair, courts consider the 
four non-exclusive212 statutory factors: 
 
 210 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not 
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls 
for case-by-case analysis.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 
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(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.213 
The ultimate goal of weighing the Fair Use factors is to 
determine whether subordinating the copyright holder’s interests 
would serve the purposes of copyright.214 
Much of the judicial doctrine of Fair Use is justified by the 
same need to subordinate the copyright to the broader policy 
directive of “promoting the useful arts and sciences.”215  The 
doctrine has also been used as a means of policing the boundaries 
between idea and expression in works that straddle the line 
between utilitarian and expressive.216  The Federal Circuit noted 
 
588–89 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The Copyright Act itself lists four non-exclusive factors—I 
emphasize non-exclusive—to consider in this inquiry.”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 
236–37 (1990) (“Congress provided examples of fair use . . . and listed four non-
exclusive factors that a court must consider in determining whether an unauthorized use 
is not infringing….”); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting 
that the factors are non-exclusive). 
 213 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 214 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at  578 (citation omitted) (“All [factors] are to be explored, 
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”). 
 215 See id. at 575 n.5 (“The exclusion of facts and ideas from copyright protection serves 
that goal as well.” (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 
(1991)))); Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 
1977) (“The fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a 
copyright holder with the public’s interest in dissemination of information affecting areas 
of universal concern, such as art, science and industry.”); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 
F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[C]opyright protection is designed ‘To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ and the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright 
holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself.”); see also 
Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: “Fair Use” Looks Different on 
Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (1980) [hereinafater “Note, Universal City 
Studios”] (“Fair use applies where the exclusivity of an author’s rights would retard, 
rather than promote, the progress of art, science, and history.”). 
 216 See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 644 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (“AT would lose this copyright case even if the raw data were so entangled 
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this function of Fair Use in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
America Inc.,217 in stating that: 
The fair use reproductions of a computer program 
must not exceed what is necessary to understand the 
unprotected elements of the work. This limited 
exception is not an invitation to misappropriate 
protectable expression. Any reproduction of 
protectable expression must be strictly necessary to 
ascertain the bounds of protected information within 
the work.218 
The Atari court noted that fair use played a vital role in 
balancing the rights of the copyright holder with public interest in 
building on pre-existing ideas.219  The fair use defense thus 
prevents authors from claiming a property interest that is so 
expansive that the ultimate objectives of the copyright act are 
undermined.220 
 
with Market Drive that they could not be extracted without making a copy of the 
program.”); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“Enforcement of a total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copyright 
Act itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable material.”); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The unprotected ideas and 
functions of the code therefore are frequently undiscoverable in the absence of 
investigation and translation that may require copying the copyrighted material.  We 
conclude that, under the facts of this case and our precedent, Connectix’s intermediate 
copying and use of Sony’s copyrighted BIOS was a fair use for the purpose of gaining 
access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s software.”); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The need to disassemble object code arises, if at 
all, only in connection with operations systems, system interface procedures, and other 
programs that are not visible to the user when operating—and then only when no 
alternative means of gaining an understanding of those ideas and functional concepts 
exists.  In our view, consideration of the unique nature of computer object code thus is 
more appropriate as part of the case-by-case, equitable ‘fair use’ analysis authorized by 
section 107 of the Act.”). 
 217 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 218 Id. at 843. 
 219 See id. at 842 (“The Copyright Act thus balances ‘the interests of authors . . . in the 
control and exploitation of their writings . . . on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interests in the free flow of ideas, [and] information . . . on the other hand.’” (quoting 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1984))) 
(omissions and alterations in original). 
 220 See id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50). 
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Moreover, the factors themselves specifically enforce the 
distinction between idea and expression.  The first factor, for 
example, inquires into the purpose and character of the use largely 
to determine whether the use is an attempt to ascertain what parts 
of the work are unprotected ideas rather than a naked attempt to 
profit from misappropriation.221  This distinction has been labeled 
as one between commercial and productive use.222  The difficulty 
is that profit-motive is not always mutually exclusive with other 
more benign uses.223 
Courts applying the first factor have therefore instead focused 
on the direct interplay between the doctrine and the constitutional 
mandate to promote the useful arts and sciences by determining 
 
 221 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) 
(“The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor 
that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.  ‘[E]very commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to 
the owner of the copyright.’” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 451)); Pac. & S. 
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) (“This commercial nature of the use 
militates quite strongly against a finding of fair use . . . .”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Handgun 
Control Fed’n, 844 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (“What is necessary is a 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future 
harm exists.  If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed.  
But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”); Ass’n 
of Am. Med. Colls. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (D. Pa. 1983) (“[A] court should 
not strain to apply the fair use defense when it is being invoked by a profit-making 
defendant that has made extensive verbatim use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
materials.”). 
 222 See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), 
reversed, Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417 (“Despite the nebulous character of the 
doctrine, previous case law and the general copyright scheme do provide us with 
considerable guidance.  As the first sentence of [§] 107 indicates, fair use has 
traditionally involved what might be termed the ‘productive use’ of copyrighted 
material.”).  The Ninth Circuit in that case seemed to derive the term from commentary 
classifying certain types of uses as “productive uses,” in that such uses “incorporate[ ] the 
copyrighted material in a developmental process, that is, in creating a second work or 
carrying on research or education.” Note, Universal City Studios, supra note 215, at 
1013. 
 223 See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In 
fact, publishers of educational textbooks are as profit-motivated as publishers of scandal-
mongering tabloid newspapers.  And a serious scholar should not be despised and denied 
the law’s protection because he hopes to earn a living through his scholarship.  The 
protection of the statute should not turn on sackcloth and missionary zeal.  It rather 
directs the court to make an appraisal of social usefulness and of commercial fair play.”). 
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whether the new work is “transformative.”224  The Supreme Court 
has reasoned that transformative uses weigh in favor of fair use 
because “the goal of copyright . . . is generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works.”225  By determining whether a 
work is transformative a court in turn determines whether such a 
fair use furthers the broader policy objectives of allowing the 
public to build on ideas226 or facts,227 precisely the same objective 
sought through the application of the idea-expression doctrine. 
Likewise, when applying the second factor courts have turned 
to the nature of the work, expanding copyright protection when the 
work is creative and contracting protection when the work is 
factual or utilitarian.228  In sum, the second factor safeguards 
against the monopolization of facts, utility, and ideas under the 
guise of copyright protection.  Fair Use can therefore be viewed as 
complimentary to the idea-expression doctrine, safeguarding 
 
 224 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“The 
central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, 
or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”) (citations omitted). 
 225 Id. 
 226 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 227 See  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (“Facts, whether 
alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be 
copyrighted.”). 
 228 See Diamond v. Am-Law Pub. Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing MCA, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d. Cir. 1981) (“The work in question was avowedly 
informational, and such works may be more freely published under Section 107 than 
those of a creative nature.”); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 
972 (9th Cir. 1981) (“If a work is more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is 
less likely that a claim of fair use will be accepted.”); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random 
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Whether the privilege may justifiably be 
applied to particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g., whether 
their distribution would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information 
and whether their preparation requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same 
subject matter. Consequently, the privilege has been applied to works in the fields of 
science, law, medicine, history and biography.”); Monster Commc’ns v. Turner Broad. 
Sys., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)) (“The second of the factors, the nature 
of the copyrighted work, focuses on the degree of creativity of the copyrighted work.  
‘[T]he more creative a work, the more protection it should be accorded from copying.’”) 
(alteration in original). 
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against the rigid application of the copyright laws to the detriment 
of the public interest.229 
IV. IDEA-EXPRESSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
The distinction between idea and expression is largely a 
judicial and statutory construct.230  Yet, the Constitution on its face 
makes a distinction between “science and useful arts.”231  This 
distinction can be interpreted as distinguishing between utilitarian 
works and the expression of knowledge.  Utilitarian works are 
often intertwined with the ideas giving rise to their design,232 yet 
 
 229 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The doctrine of fair use, originally created 
and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster.”). 
 230 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); accord Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) 
(holding that the accounting process underlying accounting forms was not within the 
subject matter of copyright). 
 231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 232 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.  An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful 
article’.”); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f an 
article has any intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be denied copyright protection except 
to the extent that its artistic features can be identified separately and are capable of 
existing independently as a work of art.”); Custom Chrome Inc. v. Ringer, 35 U.S.P.Q.2D 
(BNA) 1714, 1716 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that copyright protects utilitarian works to the 
extent that they are conceptually separable from protectable expression).  The difficulty 
in protecting non-literal elements of computer programs reflects the intertwining of idea 
and expression in utilitarian works. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 
Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the non-literal elements of code can 
be protected to the extent that the work embodies expression rather than ideas); Whelan 
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the structure, sequence, and organization of code can be protected under copyright).  
“Courts, however, have struggled to define what other elements of a computer program, 
literal and/or  non-literal, to which a computer program’s copyright protection extends.” 
Digital Commc’ns Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (D. 
Ga. 1987); see also Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a programmer 
may effectuate certain functions within a program,—i.e., express the idea embodied in a 
given subroutine—efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to 
make only one or two forms of expression workable options.”). 
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the sciences, or the expression of knowledge, while embodying 
ideas, can be reformulated and expressed in different terms.233 
Commentators, however, have concluded that the phrase “must 
be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the 
purpose of the power but not in limitation of its exercise.”234  
Although the phrase can be interpreted as part of an aspiration 
preamble,235 it is clear that the distinction could not have been 
meaningless, or else a simple and broad constitutional mandate to 
 
 233 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, 
J.) (“[T]he right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations”).  Later in this decision Judge Hand further delves into the notion 
that ideas can be restated in different ways with the following example: 
[W]e do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely 
enough for infringement. How far that correspondence must go is 
another matter. Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to 
the characters, quite independently of the “plot” proper, though, as 
far as we know, such a case has never arisen. 
Id.  Judge Hand goes on to state the proposition that the same plot can be restated in 
different ways by using Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night as an example.  Judge Hand opined 
that 
[i]f Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second 
comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to 
infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he 
cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the 
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his 
mistress. 
Id. 
 234 1 NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 103 [A] (citations omitted). 
 235 The provision can be interpreted as conflating the vesting of private with a broader 
public benefit.  James Madison commented on the clause noting that “[t]he utility of this 
power will scarcely be questioned.  The copyright of authors has been solemnly 
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law . . . .  The public good fully 
coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals.  The States cannot separately 
make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the 
decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
43 (James Madison) (emphasis added).  The national character of the rights afforded 
under the copyright clause reinforce the premise that protecting intellectual property 
rights uniformly is in direct accord with the interests of the several states. See Goldstein 
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (“The interests of a State which grants copyright 
protection may, however, be adversely affected by other States that do not; individuals 
who wish to purchase a copy of a work protected in their own State will be able to buy 
unauthorized copies in other States where no protection exists.”). 
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protect works would have done just as well.236  The distinction can 
serve as the basis for a constitutional requirement that the task of 
protecting ideas and expression are distinct undertakings. 
This section will argue that the distinction between idea and 
expression is a constitutional requirement rather than a judicial 
division of labor between the copyright and patent laws.  The 
constitutional nature of the doctrine is particularly relevant when 
federal law affords copyright-like protection under an alternative 
constitutional grant of power such as the Commerce Clause or 
Treaty Power. 
This section will interpret Article I, Section 8 Clause 8 of the 
Constitution to embody the dichotomy between idea and 
expression.  This section will further argue that if the doctrine is a 
constitutional requirement such requirement must sometimes 
constrain an exercise of congressional power under an alternative 
constitutional grant or else authors could protect their works 
without the constraints of the doctrine and potentially monopolize 
both the expression of ideas and the underlying ideas themselves. 
 As the analytical corollaries of the idea-expression doctrine 
indicate, the idea-expression doctrine has five indispensable 
purposes: 
1. the doctrine ensures that the protection of ideas remain 
within the province of patent law and are subject to 
rigorous patent examination; 
2. the doctrine ensures that the public domain can 
continue to use necessary elements of expression, such 
as numbers, short pairings of words, or combinations of 
letters; 
 
 236 The qualifying phrase explains why certain works should be protected.  Without a 
direct indication that the protection was to serve the public interest, many of the 
balancing features of copyright, such as the idea-expression doctrine, the doctrine of 
merger, and the defense of fair use could not have evolved because protecting the 
underlying ideas and facts of a work would not be a priority. See Wainwright Securities 
Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The doctrine offers a 
means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with the public’s interest in 
dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, science, 
history, or industry.”); see also infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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3. the doctrine carefully facilitates non-literal protection of 
computer software without conferring patent-like 
protection on computer programs; 
4. the doctrine minimizes the impact of copyright 
protection on First Amendment rights; and 
5. the doctrine ensures that individuals can determine the 
metes and bounds of naturally amorphous intellectual 
property rights. 
The functional purposes of the idea-expression doctrine 
support the constitutional mandate at the heart of the Copyright 
Clause.  Promoting the progress of the useful arts and sciences 
means, among other things, ensuring that a property right is well 
defined and discretely protected.  It also means that any property 
rights given to products of the mind are carefully balanced with 
other fundamental constitutional rights.  To be sure, an intellectual 
property right that creates a property right at the expense of the 
First Amendment right would defeat the very principle underlying 
the Constitution’s authorization to protect intellectual property. 
If one considers the protection of intellectual property as a 
bargain between the government and the author,237 the property 
right must come at the expense of the public being able to build on 
the ideas of the work and to eventually build on the expressive 
elements.238  The Copyright Clause demands a practical balancing 
of interests.239  This pragmatic balancing requires the consideration 
of functional problems.  Many of the functional problems have 
been solved by copyright law’s rich doctrine.  Protecting 
expressive works absent the tradition of doctrines that have 
developed over the years may undermine the delicate balance of 
interests achieved by the Copyright Act. 
Yet for such doctrines to apply they must be elevated to 
constitutional stature, or else they will not impose any constraints 
 
 237 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 238 See id. 
 239 See Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 94. 
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on other exercises of constitutional power.  This section will argue 
that the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional doctrine.  The 
idea-expression doctrine has solved many of the pragmatic 
problems that arise when protecting expression to a different 
degree than ideas.  A third category of protection that does not 
make the distinction between idea and expression could threaten 
the divide between patent and copyright law. 
Many of the arguments for a constitutionally required idea-
expression doctrine are pragmatic.  The doctrine would facilitate 
the asymmetric examination and registration requirements of 
existing patent and copyright laws.240  The doctrine would better 
define the property right being given to an author, and alleviate 
vagueness and lack of notice issues when criminal sanctions are 
imposed for misappropriating of works subject to amorphous 
delineation.  Moreover, while existing copyright and patent laws 
may successfully promote the useful arts and sciences, a third class 
of protections that are accompanied by criminal sanctions may 
chill the creation of derivative works, undermining the Copyright 
Clause’s policy of promoting the useful arts and sciences. 
Functional reasons alone do not warrant interpreting the 
Copyright Clause to embody an idea-expression dichotomy.  The 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution can be interpreted 
to mandate a difference in protection between idea and expression.  
This section will also propose a textual argument to support such a 
distinction and in turn support a constitutional idea-expression 
doctrine. 
A. Maintaining the Division Between Patent and Copyright Law 
Protecting intellectual property rights similar to those governed 
by the copyright and patent laws would undermine the divisions 
between copyright and patent.  Copyright law does not require that 
an invention be novel, instead it requires only originality.241  That 
 
240 See infra note 245–247 and accompanying text. 
 241 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”); 
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although 
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is, authors that independently produce the same work without 
access to each other’s works would not be liable for 
infringement.242  Patents, on the other hand, condition the property 
right on the invention being new and non-obvious.243  Only the 
first of two independent inventors would receive the property right, 
regardless of access considerations.244  One inventor would be an 
innovator in the eyes of the law and the other an infringer. 
These differences have given rise to very different examination 
processes and protections.  Patents are subject to rigorous 
examination; copyrights are not.245  To enforce this distinction, 
either patent law cannot protect the same subject matter as 
copyright law,246 or the works must provide different protections 
that are in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining the property 
 
novelty, uniqueness and ingenuity are not required, independent creation is.” (citing L. 
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d. Cir. 1976))). 
 242 See Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Independent 
creation, on the other hand, can rebut a presumption of copying after the copyright 
plaintiff establishes access and substantial similarity.” (citing Taylor Corp. v. Four 
Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005))); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 
Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f independent creation results in an 
identical work, the creator of that work is free to sell it.”(citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 
896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
 243 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2000) amended by 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (Supp. II 2002). 
 244 See Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 302 (1894) (“If Steward 
were in fact the first to invent the pivotal extension to a butt adjuster, he is entitled to a 
patent therefor.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (citing Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)) (“[A] party that does not have the earliest effective filing date needs only to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it was the first to invent if the two 
patents or applications at issue were co-pending before the PTO.”). 
 245 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954) (“[D]esign patents require the critical 
examination given patents to protect the public against monopoly.”); Stein v. Expert 
Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611, 612–13 (7th Cir. 1951) (“Congress has provided two separate 
and distinct classes or fields of protection, the copyright and the patent. . . . The 
Copyright Office makes no examination or search as to the originality or novelty of the 
claimed ‘work of art.’  Applications for design patents are . . . subject to an examination 
in which the examiner searches through all available publications, prior patents and all 
prior art available, to determine if the design possesses the qualities requisite to granting 
a design patent.”). 
 246 The idea-expression doctrine ensures that overlaps between patentable and 
copyrightable subject matter are resolved.  The doctrine serves a sorting purpose, 
preventing idea-intertwined works from gaining protection without being subject to 
rigorous patent examination. 
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right.247  Regardless of how such a division occurs, such a division 
is necessary to facilitate divergent doctrines. 
One can easily conceive of a statute conferring protection on 
works that could receive either patent or copyright protection but 
that either vests more rights than copyright or less rights than 
patent.  Or the statute could require more lax examination than 
patents yet protect the idea underlying the work just the same.  
Such a statute would provide an incentive not to use existing patent 
laws as a means of protecting works when more lax examination 
will yield equivalent protection of the underlying ideas of the 
work.248  A similar incentive might exist not to seek copyright 
protection because a copyright-like work could receive a patent-
like monopoly under a different statute with more lax examination 
requirements than patents.249 
Another possible complication may arise if one can seek 
overlapping protections of the work.250  A copyright could receive 
protection under the copyright laws and receive even more 
protections under a third criminal statute.  The addition of further 
sanctions for misappropriation of a copyright would bolster the 
strength of the copyright and tip the delicate balance between 
 
 247 Patents are protected for twenty years and bestow a complete monopoly in the 
underlying ideas of an invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a 
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date 
on which the application for the patent was filed . . .”).  Copyrights protect the work for a 
longer duration, typically the author’s life plus seventy years, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), but 
the property right is substantially weaker. Cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that copyrights create less market 
power than patents). 
 248 Cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“It is no accident that patent protection has preconditions that 
copyright protection does not—notably, the requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness—and that patents are granted for a shorter period than copyrights.”). 
 249 The anti-bootlegging statute in Moghadam is an excellent example.  The statute 
imposed a bar on misappropriating live performances without the requirements of 
fixation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273–75 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 250 Although overlaps between patent and copyright protection already occur, the idea-
expression doctrine has mediated between doctrines to retain the delicate balance implicit 
in each statutory scheme.  A third form of protection that is unconstrained by such a 
mediating mechanism may destroy the balance struck between protection and innovation 
in both patent and copyright statutory schemes. 
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protection and public benefit.251  A copyright scheme that receives 
reinforcements from alternative commerce statutes would make it 
difficult to determine, a priori, where the line between private 
monopoly and public domain falls.252 
B. Indeterminate Delineation of Property, Transactional 
Certainty, and Due Process Rights 
The idea-expression doctrine facilitates a more concise 
definition of the property rights granted by the Copyright Act.  
Without the doctrine the property right being conferred by an 
alternate statute may be difficult to delineate and in turn protect.  
One of the most fundamental protections afforded property are 
rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.253  Procedural Due Process protects the deprivation 
of property from arbitrary government conduct by imposing 
procedural constraints.254  It becomes difficult to determine when 
such procedural requirements must be afforded an owner of 
intellectual property.255 
 
 251 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(“The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance 
between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.  What is 
basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner’s monopoly—from how large an 
area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?”). 
252
 The Fair Use Doctrine has been criticized for possessing the same deficiency.  The 
indeterminate nature of the four factors makes it difficult to predict where the line 
between liability and fair use lies. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion And Rights Accretion 
In Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 889 (2007) (“The case law has been 
particularly unhelpful.  The Supreme Court’s first incursions into fair use immediately 
struck a chord that still resonates in the jurisprudence: the doctrine’s equitable, fact-
specific, and thus indeterminate nature.  Those who were hoping for hard and fast rules 
were out of luck, and have remained so since.  From the ex post perspective of the 
defendant already embroiled in expensive litigation, an adaptable, equitable defense is 
useful.  But for the prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will prove to be 
infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante guidance.”). 
 253 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST amend. V. 
 254 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are 
meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”). 
 255 Cf. Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1021 (1st Cir. 
1989) (noting that the due process rights depend on how property is defined). 
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It also becomes difficult to determine what Due Process rights 
a potential infringer that independently creates the same work will 
be afforded.  The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is established 
that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain 
as to the conduct it prohibits.”256  Without idea-expression it 
becomes difficult for the law to determine whether someone is a 
pirate or a resourceful innovator, whether the law encourages his 
behavior or can deprive him of the fruits of his intellectual labor. 
This problem of defining the boundaries of one’s rights will 
always be a side effect of protecting intangible rights.  Courts must 
decide the scope of the intangible rights the Copyright Act affords 
individuals.  Courts face the same issue when protecting intangible 
substantive Due Process rights, or in preventing statutes grounded 
in animus under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.  It 
is clear that the scope of intangible rights is a judicially 
manageable issue. 
However, the idea-expression doctrine mitigates much of the 
indeterminacy inherent in the process of delineating such rights by 
ensuring that certain elements of a work—its ideas—are certainly 
not included in the bundle of rights afforded under federal 
copyright law.  The goal of doctrinal stability is to facilitate certain 
forms of private conduct, not necessarily to ensure that post hoc 
judicial determinations can be made.  Certainty in standards of 
conduct provides clear notice to individuals, thus increasing the 
probability that private parties will transact.  With intellectual 
property rights, such as copyrights, which depend on the use of 
ideas and prior expression, transactional certainty will ensure that 
private parties will not have to factor the risk of erroneous 
deprivation into their transactions. 
C. Amorphously Defined Property Rights and Criminal Liability 
The anti-bootlegging statute in United States v. Moghadam 
imposed criminal sanctions of five to ten years in prison for an 
unauthorized fixation of a live performance.257  Yet unlike a statute 
 
 256 Giaccio v. Pa., 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966). 
 257 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006). 
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punishing the violation of another’s rights to tangible property, the 
rights being protected by such a criminal statute are not as well 
defined.  Questions of what constitutes a live performance or an 
unauthorized fixation loom beneath the seemingly clear text.  
Intellectual property rights are defined by the law that gives rise to 
their creation.  Much of intellectual property body of doctrine can 
be indeterminate absent judicial review.  This uncertainty in turn 
often chills the use of public domain ideas that might find 
protection in the copyright laws. 
Those seeking to use copyrighted works are often faced with 
the prospect of facing civil liabilities should their estimations of 
the scope of a work’s intellectual property rights prove incorrect.258  
Criminal sanctions, however, would preclude infringers from even 
attempting to assert a fair use defense.  Thus, not only would 
criminal sanctions eviscerate the fair use defense, but the overall 
chilling effect on the production of new works is much greater. 
Being faced with the improbable prospect of facing civil 
damages for copyright infringement may make an undertaking 
nevertheless worth it.  One would simply multiply the probability 
of being found liable for infringement by the amount of damages 
one expects.  Criminal sanctions, however, may never be worth the 
risk.  Individuals seeking to create works that may result in 
criminal sanctions may be deterred from the undertaking 
altogether.259  If such a statute is free of the constraints of the idea-
expression doctrine, individuals seeking to use what should be 
public domain will not have the additional comfort of knowing that 
certain portions of the work can never be part of the property right 
and will certainly be chilled from using any part of the work. 
At the core of the Intellectual Property Clause’s charge is to 
promote the useful arts and sciences.260  An integral part of 
promoting such works through property incentives is allowing the 
 
 258 Gibson, supra note 252, at 885. 
 259 This reasoning has been employed in the context of criminal laws that may chill First 
Amendment expression. See U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1994) 
(applying scienter requirement in a criminal statute to apply to both the sexually explicit 
nature of a work and the age of the performers in sexually explicit film in order to avoid a 
chilling effect on First Amendment expression). 
 260 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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public an intellectual base to build on.  Indeed, there are few ideas 
that owe nothing to another’s work.  Ideas fuel ideas.  Absent the 
flexibility to build on the works of others one cannot expect a 
property rights incentive scheme such as the one contemplated by 
the Constitution to work.  If the property rights created under 
alternate exercises of power are not bound by the doctrines 
developed to define and delineate the scope of the property right 
being awarded, then such laws are free to chill the creation of the 
works that the copyright and patent laws intend to facilitate and 
encourage. 
D. A Textual Derivation of Idea-Expression 
The idea-expression doctrine is implicit in the language of the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.  That clause states the 
following  “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”261  The phrase 
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts” has been 
interpreted as a mere preamble, stating the broad purpose of the 
clause.  Professor Nimmer notes that “this introductory phrase is in 
the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself 
constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must 
be measured.  Its effect at most is to suggest certain minimal 
elements to be contained in copyright legislation.”262 
The predominant interpretation of this phrase has been as 
constitutional garnish of only aesthetic relevance.  The phrase is, 
however, far more than an explanation of the broader purposes of 
the provision.  It makes a distinction between types of works.  By 
defining the clause’s purpose in terms of what it protects, the 
distinction between the useful arts and sciences implies that the 
useful arts are not the sciences, and that the constitutional mandate 
is to protect both.  These two types of works are not equivalent or 
else an encapsulating phrase could have been used.  Beneath this 
distinction is the idea-expression doctrine.  Copyright is to protect 
one form of work, while patents are to protect the other. 
 
 261 Id. 
 262 NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 1.03. 
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A possible purpose behind this distinction is that the useful 
arts, unlike the sciences may require content specific 
determinations by the government.  The determination of what is 
or is not useful is a subject matter specific one.  Separating the 
works would allow one form of work to be regulated without 
regard to subject matter, while another form of work could be 
regulated after a thorough subject matter inquiry. 
This interpretation is consistent with avoiding the evils of the 
early interpretations of the clause, which contemplated content 
controls on what could be protected under copyright law.263  
Subject matter determinations led to the invalidation of copyrights 
in obscene materials because they failed to promote the useful arts 
and sciences.264  The inherent chilling effect of government subject 
matter regulation led to a firm division between the subject matter 
specific protections of patent law and the subject matter 
independent protections of copyright law.265  This division could 
have been what was intended in the distinction between the useful 
arts and sciences in the Constitution.  The distinction may have 
been made to avoid subject matter regulation of literary and artistic 
works, and in turn relieve the inherent tension between protecting 
copyrightable works and rights afforded under the First 
Amendment. 
 
 263 See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 
1979) (“Congress could reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativity is 
not to impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable works.  
By making this choice Congress removes the chilling effect of governmental judgments 
on potential authors and avoids the strong possibility that governmental officials 
(including judges) will err in separating the useful from the non-useful.”). 
 264 See Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9173) (“Hence, it 
expressly appears that congress is not empowered by the constitution to pass laws for the 
protection or benefit of authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the 
progress of ‘science and useful arts.’  For this reason, an invention expressly designed to 
facilitate the commission of crime, as murder, burglary, forgery or counterfeiting, 
however novel or ingenious, could not be patented.  So with a dramatic composition 
which is grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people.  The 
exhibition of such a drama neither ‘promotes the progress of science or useful arts,’ but 
the contrary.”). 
 265 See Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860. 
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Applying the well-known canon of construction, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius,266 would mean that the enumeration of 
two types of works—useful arts and sciences—would imply the 
exclusion of other types of works.  Thus Congress can only protect 
ideas and expression and it can only do so under the constraints of 
the provision’s requirements.  The division between types of works 
is itself a constraint on congressional power.  Under such an 
interpretation, a distinction between the two types of works is 
mandatory rather than permissive. 
This distinction creates a wall of separation between the types 
of works.  If one protects ideas after thorough review, the other 
must not if the review process is weaker.  If one requires subject 
matter constraints on the “useful arts” phrase, and the lack of such 
constraints on the “sciences” phrase, the provision can be 
interpreted as requiring that one form of work be regulated with 
respect to permissible subject matter and the other be regulated 
independent of subject matter.  To maintain a division between 
works that receive protection after thorough review of their subject 
matter and protections that attach to works without subject matter 
review requires that the weaker protection remain separate and 
independent from the boundaries of the stronger.  To be sure, a 
copyright that protects ideas would allow an author to circumvent 
the thorough patent review process.  The intrusion, however, 
would harm both intellectual property rights.  Although the 
copyright holder would receive patent like protection without 
review of the work’s subject matters in most cases, a court may 
sometimes review the subject matter that a copyright is predicated 
on for novelty and non-obviousness, which is a small step away 
from censorship.  Judicial review of the subject matter of literary 
works, for example, would retard rather than promote the progress 
of the arts.  One can conceive of a situation in which it would be 
better to forgo the property right all together and avoid judicial 
review of the novelty of one’s literary work. 
Assuming a dichotomy of works such that some works can be 
regulated based on subject matter and some works cannot, such an 
 
 266 The canon literally means that “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
another.” See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006). 
BATHAEE_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:14:51 PM 
2008] A CONSTITUTIONAL IDEA-EXPRESSION DOCTRINE 501 
interpretation would mean that regulating the protection of ideas 
would have to be done with greater care than when regulating 
expression.  This is because an idea is the foundation of 
expression.  Regulating the subject matter of ideas that can be 
protected will allow the government to ensure that monopolies will 
not be given for ideas that are necessary for autonomy and 
expression.  The government must be free to limit the protection of 
ideas to those in which the long-term benefit to society of 
conferring a monopoly is worth the short-term restraints on their 
proliferation.  Regulating the subject matter of patents ensures that 
ideas can be freely disseminated as expression under copyright.  
The distinction facilitates the protection of both types of works. 
The distinction between the useful arts and sciences is thus 
more than a broad statement of the purpose of the Intellectual 
Property Clause.  It is instead a textual anchor for what has 
judicially developed to become the modern idea-expression 
doctrine.  The doctrine is an axiom of copyright law and it can be 
derived directly from the text of the Intellectual Property Clause. 
 
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF IDEA-EXPRESSION,  
ALTERNATE CONGRESSIONAL POWERS, AND THE CANON OF  
HORIZONTAL SUBORDINATION 
 If the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution mandates 
an idea-expression dichotomy, then the fundamental question in 
Martignon and Moghadam must be answered.  Does the Copyright 
Clause constrain the scope of the Commerce Clause?  The 
monopoly for ideas must be conferred cautiously,267 and the 
subject matter of the monopoly must be carefully regulated in 
order to facilitate the broad pool of ideas required to create 
expressive works.268  If such a fundamental doctrine can be short-
 
 267 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) 
(noting that the protection of intellectual property rights requires striking a delicate 
balance between free exploitation and providing incentives to create); Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting a similar balance). 
 268 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“Because copyright law 
ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative 
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circuited and circumvented through an exercise of alternate 
constitutional grants of power, the doctrine will lose force in the 
conventional copyright and patent context.269 
This section will consider the horizontal constraints created by 
a constitutional idea-expression doctrine.270  In particular, this 
section will consider the extent to which the constitutional idea-
expression doctrine constrains or qualifies the commerce power. 
This section will propose a test to resolve the tension between 
the narrow Intellectual Property Clause and the broad Commerce 
Power.  For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to it as the  
“Horizontal Subordination” test.  Rather than a rigid rule requiring 
the narrower clause to qualify the more general one, or a rule that 
undermines narrower provisions by allowing what the broadest 
constitutional provision allows, the Canon of Horizontal 
Subordination ensures that the analysis is more flexible and will 
ensure that Congress retains its power to legislate even amidst a 
clash of constitutional grants of power. 
A. The Nature of the Problem: Three Possibilities 
Starting from the assumption that Article I, Section 8 
implements a system of limited federal powers—enumerating 
powers that the federal government could wield, and by 
implication, denying powers not therein271—this initial assumption 
 
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as 
clearly as possible.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 
(“To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” 
(citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985))). 
 269 Why abide by the rules governing traditional patents and copyrights when one can 
seek a property right under an alternative body of law with no such constraints?  There 
may be some reasons to stick with patents or seek a copyright.  For example, a patent 
may provide more protection for the underlying ideas than an alternative statute and a 
copyright may be less costly to obtain.  However, when the difference in protection and 
cost between conventional intellectual property protections and an alternate body of law 
become negligible, the incentive to circumvent the idea-expression doctrine becomes far 
greater.  
 270 As used herein, “horizontal” means any constraints resulting from other Article I 
provisions. 
 271 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 301 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(condoning the limited federal power assumption); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57–58 
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means that each clause is an island.  It can support only an exercise 
of power within its scope.  If the Intellectual Property Clause 
allows the protection of works for limited times, then the 
implication is that it cannot protect works for an indefinite period 
of time.272  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments require that 
whatever is not enumerated is reserved by either the states or the 
people of the United States.273  Although the Tenth Amendment, 
has proven an inert qualification of the Commerce Power,274 its 
existence implies a general structure of circumscribed grants of 
power.  Absent the assumption that nothing other than what is 
granted in the Constitution belongs to the federal government, the 
Tenth Amendment would be far too dynamic a qualification of 
federal power to justify its very existence.275  The reservation of 
 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce 
Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything-and the Federal Government is no longer 
one of limited and enumerated powers.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155, 
(1992) (“‘[T[he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.’” (quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”). 
 272 Although it has been argued that the current term of copyright protection violates the 
Limited Times provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has disagreed. See 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).  The Supreme Court has been quite 
deferential when it comes to defining the scope of the intellectual property protections 
under the Constitutional provision. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 (“[I]t is 
Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly 
that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product.”).  It is hard to conceive of any term, as long as it is conceptually finite, 
that would violate the provision. 
 273 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX–X. 
 274 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) 
(holding that the Tenth Amendment should not interpreted as barring the federal 
government’s exercise of the Commerce Power when it impinges on functions 
traditionally relegated to the states).  The Garcia Court overruled National League of 
Cities v. Usery, see id. at 47, which held exactly the opposite. See 426 U.S. 833, 852 
(1976) (“This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal 
system of government embodied in the Constitution.  We hold that insofar as the 
challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the 
authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.”). 
 275 The Tenth Amendment can be viewed as no different than a mandatory canon of 
interpretation.  That is, the power expressly given to the states are not an exhaustive list.  
In a more formal sense, the provision applies the exclusio alterius canon to federal 
powers and not to state powers. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
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powers to the states implies a fixed subset of government powers 
that are not at any given time granted to the federal government.  If 
the federal government can only exercise powers it is expressly 
given then, there are other powers that the federal government does 
not have.  It follows from the Amendments that what was not 
given to the federal government can be retained by the states or the 
people. 
The fundamental question is whether this assumption is 
justified in all cases.  There are three possible scenarios to 
consider.  First, when a more specific grant of constitutional power 
is being used to justify the exercise of congressional power, and 
such a grant of power would be forbidden under a more general 
provision, the need for subordination should be at its minimum.  
The intermediate case is when two provisions of equal scope both 
reach the same exercise of congressional power.  In such a case, 
the assumption should be that the provisions should be alternate.  If 
one grant of power fails the other should be able to nevertheless 
support congressional action.  Finally when a narrower 
constitutional provision addresses a particular exercise of 
congressional power, a broader power should only apply if doing 
so would not eviscerate the narrower provision. 
These three categories are not discrete.  It is difficult to 
compare the scope of some constitutional provisions, but in some 
cases a provision might be subject matter specific while another is 
a general grant of power.  This indicates a difference in scope.  For 
example, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be considered a 
general grant of congressional power because of its broad terms 
and interpreted scope, whereas the Intellectual Property Clause is 
far more circumscribed, addressing only the protection of 
intellectual property rights.  The very nature of the grants of power 
differ from one another. 
The Commerce Clause, like the § 5 power, is a general grant of 
power.  Both provisions however are considered broad because 
 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 561–62 (1994) (“The message 
of the Tenth Amendment is that expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to lists of 
governmental powers.  All powers not delegated to the federal government by the 
Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people. The amended text expressly 
precludes the existence of unenumerated, or inherent, powers of government.”). 
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they have been interpreted so expansively.  The scope of such 
power, which appears on its face to be subject matter specific, 
depends on the interpretation it is given.  The Commerce Power of 
one hundred years ago is not the commerce power today.  This is 
precisely the problem with applying the Trademark Cases today.  
Since the Commerce Power would not support the exercise of 
congressional power in that case the court had no occasion to 
decide whether the provision would qualify a narrower 
constitutional provision.  Similarly, comparing § 5’s scope after 
the Slaughterhouse Cases276 with the Commerce Clause of today 
would reveal a stark contrast between the scope of the two 
provisions. 
Thus two important factors determine, which of the three 
scenarios are at issue.  First, the express terms of the clause.  Is it 
on its face very subject matter specific, if so, how specific?  
Second, the interpretive scope of the provisions must be compared.  
Determining which category a specific case is in determines 
whether the assumption that each provision qualifies the other 
applied with full force. 
The only time that balancing is necessary is when a broader 
constitutional provision is being used to address an issue within the 
scope of a narrower Constitutional provision.  The assumption that 
each Article I provision qualifies the other, creating discrete 
islands of constitutional power is at its zenith.  It is readily 
apparent that the Commerce Clause, reaching everything from 
trains to home-grown wheat, is far broader in its reach that the 
Intellectual Property clause.  Falling in the third category, the 
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause must 
be balanced against the purpose of the narrower Intellectual 
Property Clause. 
B. Fashioning a Test to Balance the Commerce and Intellectual 
Property Clauses 
The Commerce Clause is an Article I power just as the 
Intellectual Property Clause is. The grant of Article I powers are 
presented in a serial form, enumerating congressional powers one 
 
 276 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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after the other.277  This would naturally imply that Article I powers 
are implicitly related and can modify or qualify one another.  The 
truth of this proposition is what is essentially at issue in Martignon 
and Moghadam. 
The power to regulate commerce is far broader than the power 
to regulate intellectual property rights.  Congressional power to 
regulate commerce must be weighed against Congress’ power to 
protect intellectual property rights and one must be subordinated to 
the other.  There are two traditional ways to address this issue.  
Either one must determine which one of these rights is most 
important or one must simply choose the provision that is most 
specifically targeted at the subject matter being regulated as the 
supporting power.  The latter method is the principle employed in 
Moghadam.278  The former is the method employed in 
Martignon.279 
The consequences of choosing between these two constructions 
of the two Article I powers are significant.  To hold the Commerce 
Clause to be constrained by narrower Article I provisions would 
imply that all narrower Article I powers similarly constraint the 
commerce clause, substantially restricting congressional power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  On the other hand, if the two clauses 
are interpreted as separate and independent grants of power that do 
not qualify each other, then the sole arbiter of congressional power 
will be the broadest clause in Article I, the Commerce Clause. 
Both interpretations can produce absurd results.  Instead, a 
subordination test that considers both the doctrine that would 
qualify the alternative exercise of power and the nature of the 
 
 277 Article I, Section 8 begins with the phrase “The Congress shall have power to” and 
enumerates the various congressional powers, delimiting each with semi-colon. See, e.g., 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (“To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;”); 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;”).  Each clause after the first clause in 
Section 8 are dependent on the phrase, “Congress shall have the power to,” indicating 
that each subsequent clause is part of a grouping of congressional powers.  This 
“grouping” implies some special relationship between the various Article I Section 8 
powers, making it more likely that they are meant to qualify one another in certain 
circumstances or to operate co-extensively. 
 278 See supra Section I, (a)(i). 
 279 See Supra Section I, (a)(ii). 
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constitutional power being subordinated would produce more 
sound results.  This balancing test should consider how vital the 
doctrine being circumvented is to the constitutional provision in 
which it originates from and weigh the purpose it serves against 
the burden it will place on the horizontal constitutional power. 
In the case of the constitutional idea-expression doctrine, the 
court will have to weigh the underlying purpose of the doctrine, to 
facilitate subject-matter independent regulation in copyright and 
subject-matter regulation in patents, against the purposes of 
passing copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause.  
The test would operate as a horizontal preemption test.  If the 
circumvention of the horizontal provision would pose an 
intolerable burden on the exercise of the constitutional grant of 
power, then the burdening provision must be subordinated.  
Reciprocally, if the broader grant of power would pose an obstacle 
to the execution of the other constitutional provision then the 
broader provision must be subordinated. 
The test would require that a horizontal provision be allowed to 
constrain its sister clause as long as doing so does not pose an 
undue burden to the exercise of the first provision.  The Commerce 
Clause could be subordinated to the Intellectual Property Clause if 
the doctrine that would qualify the Commerce Clause is necessary 
to the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause.  For example, 
the circumvention of the originality requirement in copyright, a 
constitutional doctrine, would not be readily tolerated, while the 
circumvention of fixation may not compel the subordination of the 
commerce clause.  The test requires courts to engage in a case-by-
case analysis. 
C. The Test 
The Horizontal Subordination test requires the consideration of 
three elements.  First the court must determine whether qualifying 
the broader second provision will frustrate the goals of the first.  
Second, the court must determine if the qualifying provision would 
pose an undue burden to the exercise of constitutional power under 
the provision being qualified.  Third, the court must balance the 
importance of the interests furthered by the dominance of each 
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clause to determine which would be least restrictive to the overall 
scheme of constitutional distributions of power. 
The test would allow the constitutional idea-expression 
doctrine to operate on statutes passed under alternate grants of 
congressional power, but would not be allowed to interfere with 
Congress’ vital power to regulate interstate commerce.  The 
Horizontal Subordination Canon coupled with a constitutional 
idea-expression dichotomy will ensure that important divisions 
between patent and copyright laws remain intact, and that the 
boundaries of the property right conferred by the federal scheme of 
intellectual property protection is more clearly defined, regardless 
of which congressional power is used to effectuate it. 
1. Applying the Horizontal Subordination Test to a 
Constitutional Idea-Expression Doctrine 
This section will begin with the assumption that the idea-
expression doctrine is a constitutional requirement, textually 
derived from Article I Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.  
With this assumption, this section will apply the three-part 
horizontal subordination test to the conflict between the Commerce 
Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause.  This section will 
specifically address whether the commerce clause can be used to 
circumvent the requirements of a constitutional idea-expression 
doctrine. 
a) Will use of the commerce clause frustrate the goals of 
the Intellectual Property Clause, particularly the 
policies underlying the idea-expression doctrine? 
As noted earlier, the Intellectual property clause has the 
primary purpose of ensuring an economic benefit to inventors and 
authors, for a limited time, in exchange for the public use of the 
ideas after the term has expired.  Specifically, the idea-expression 
doctrine ensures that the property right that is conferred by the 
clause is adequately defined, and that the distinction between 
patents and copyrights remains a visible one.  The idea-expression 
doctrine is not only directly applied, but also supports other 
corollary doctrines, some being constitutional and others not.  In 
particular, the Fair Use defense, which has significant First 
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Amendment dimensions, would be significantly weaker without 
the Idea-Expression doctrine.  Fixation, a quasi-constitutional 
requirement, which requires an idea to manifest itself as 
expression, would also be significantly weaker without a broader 
policy-division between idea and expression. 
Commerce Clause legislation that lacks this requirement could 
be used to vest copyright-like protection without such a division, in 
turn making it difficult to ensure that the public derives the long 
term benefits of conferring economic incentives on authors and 
inventors for a limited time.  This long-term benefit is the 
cornerstone of the Intellectual Property clauses’ charge.  Authors 
and inventors are granted limited property rights so that the public 
domain can benefit from new matter. 
Granted, there is always tension when the requirements of one 
clause are being circumvented; the question is a bit leading.280 It is, 
however, clear that the economic incentive that the clause grants is 
not for its own sake.  It must yield benefits that inure to the benefit 
of the public.281  The extent that commerce legislation undermines 
the policy objectives of the intellectual property clause depends on 
what benefits the public will enjoy under the unfettered legislation.  
This aspect of the test is a fact specific inquiry.  The principle 
factor is whether the commerce legislation maintains some public 
benefit in return for the economic incentive it confers on authors 
and inventors for their ideas and expression.282 
 
 280 To presuppose that one provision is being “circumvented” by the other is to assume 
one is being subordinated to the other.  The presupposition ensures a particular answer. 
 281 It would be improper for the government to confer personal benefits on clever 
inventors.  It is assumed that if the sovereign’s treasury is being used that the public 
derive some benefit. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 338 (“[A]n acceptable rational 
basis can be neither purely personal nor purely partisan.”).  Otherwise, it would be an 
arbitrary use of government power, particularly in a democratic context.  This notion is 
rooted in the Rational Basis standard of review.  At a minimum, government action must 
be reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor concurring) (“Under our rational basis standard of 
review, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification 
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Government action that does not inure to the benefit of the 
public cannot be legitimate.  It is tenant of democratic government that the government 
must work for its polity. 
 282 This is not unlike the Court’s requirement that federal funds provided to states on the 
condition that the states implement federal standards must serve the general welfare. See 
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b) Would imposing horizontal restraints on the Commerce 
Power pose an undue burden on Congress’ power to 
regulate commerce? 
This factor inquires whether the imposition of the horizontal 
constraint would makethe regulation of interstate commerce 
impracticable.  Congress is given broad powers to legislate 
interstate commerce.  When that power is qualified by a narrower 
horizontal provision, there is a risk that the broader power will 
become inert when it addresses or even touches on subject mater 
mostly regulated by the Intellectual Property Clause.  The extent 
that the idea-expression doctrine would impact Congress’ ability to 
regulate interstate commerce would depend on whether the idea-
expression doctrine would have a direct effect on the case at hand 
or whether the doctrine would apply through one of its corollaries.  
For example, granting a monopoly on a short phrase that copyright 
law would not confer a property right on would be a more direct 
application of the idea-expression doctrine than protecting 
something that would typically be deemed a fair use under the 
copyright laws. 
The directness of the doctrine matters because the more 
directly it applies, the more of the commerce power it 
circumscribes.  If commerce legislation directly protects ideas, and 
the idea-expression doctrine applies to the Commerce Power, then 
the horizontal provision would preclude regulation completely.  
The more direct the application the more vital the qualifying 
doctrine must be to the delicate balance that the Intellectual 
Property Clause is meant to implement. 
 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (“The first of these limitations is derived from 
the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in 
pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”).  When certain congressional power is at issue, the 
central purpose is to benefit the public, in turn that benefit is implicitly guaranteed in the 
Constitutional provision.  The Intellectual Property Clause is no different.  It is implicit 
that the reward for works of authorship and inventions are in exchange for the growth of 
the public domain. 
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c) What outcome would have the least restrictive effect on 
the federal distribution of powers as they currently 
exist? 
This factor is a balancing test with special emphasis on 
maintaining the status quo.  This factor will examine the effect of 
each clause being subordinated to the other and determine which 
would disturb the status quo the least.  Specifically, in the 
Constitutional idea-expression and Commerce Clause context, 
would subordinating the Intellectual Property Clause to the 
Commerce Clause undermine the purpose of the Intellectual 
Property Clause?  Would the subordinating the broad Commerce 
Clause to the narrower Intellectual Property Clause restrict 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce? 
There are two reasons to side with the interpretation that is 
least restrictive of the subordinated clause.  First, constitutional 
interpretation must be mindful of settled expectations, perhaps one 
of the most important components of stare decisis.283  Second, it is 
difficult to ascertain the effect of any interpretation with much 
precision.284  Beginning with the least imposing interpretation will 
allow a court to reverse itself should the decision prove to be sub-
optimal or undesirable.285 
 
 283 The court often related the notion of settled expectations to the doctrine of stare 
decisis. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 548 (U.S. 1991) 
(“By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may 
dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that 
otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents.”).  The doctrine becomes a 
stronger force the longer a rule has been in place in order to protect any reliance interest 
that may have formed in the interim. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) 
(“Considerations of stare decisis are particularly forceful in the area of statutory 
construction, especially when a unanimous interpretation of a statute has been accepted 
as settled law for several decades.”). 
 284 This principle is self-evident from the existence of circuit splits.  Often times, lower 
courts will not know for certain what the Supreme Court meant in a particular opinion 
and are forced to rule in the absence of clarification, giving rise to divergent 
interpretations of the same precedent. 
 285 Broader rules tend to give rise to stronger stare decisis effect.  For example, 
overturning the central holding a decision articulating a bright-line rule would unsettle 
expectations to greater extent than overruling a more abstract ruling.  To be sure, 
overruling the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would have a 
greater effect on settled expectations because it is more theoretically ambitious.  A 
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At the margins, the tradeoff may be indeterminate.  This is 
where the balancing test becomes the most critical.  A court must 
balance the competing purposes of the two constitutional 
provisions and their doctrines to determine which must take 
precedence.  Although the three-factor approach is not a highly 
determinate analytical rule, it does provide a useful framework for 
analysis.  The starting point for analysis is often determining the 
purpose of the constitutional provision being interpreted.  This is a 
task that does not lend itself to rigid rules, which is why the test 
must remain a balancing test, to maintain the necessary play in the 
joints necessary for constitutional interpretation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The idea expression dichotomy operates to define the line 
between public domain and private monopoly.  The doctrine 
facilitates the implicit bargain in intellectual property rights for 
limited times, in that works are given short-term protections for the 
permanent benefit to the public of the ideas underlying the work.  
The doctrine is so fundamental to the scheme of protecting 
intellectual property rights that circumventing it through the 
exercise of an alternate constitutional power would undermine the 
Constitution’s very charge to promote the progress of the useful 
arts and sciences. 
If interpreted to stem from the distinction between the useful 
arts and sciences, the doctrine of idea-expression gains 
constitutional stature and can apply horizontally to constrain 
alternate exercises of power.  The extent to which horizontal 
constitutional power can constrain one another remains a difficult 
determination.  Rather than apply a rigid canon of construction, 
such as requiring a narrower constitutional provision to qualify the 
broader one, or allowing the broadest statute in the Constitution to 
be the ultimate ceiling on federal power, a test that balances the 
purpose of the qualifying provision against the burden placed on 
the qualified provision to determine which constitutional provision 
 
minimalist opinion will necessarily unsettle expectations to a lesser degree simply 
because less has been decided. 
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must yield, will produce more sound result.  This Horizontal 
Subordination test can facilitate the careful application of the 
constitutional idea-expression doctrine to sister clauses and can 
even be adapted to apply vertically to Article II powers, such as the 
Treaty Power. 
The tension between protecting intellectual property rights 
subject to carefully circumscribed limits and regulating works that 
travel through interstate commerce with fewer restrictions can be 
resolved by attempting to resolve the constitutional conflict by 
balancing each provision’s underlying purpose.  The constitutional 
mandate that congress promote the useful arts and sciences 
depends heavily on a delicate bargain being struck between author 
and the government providing the property incentive.  This bargain 
requires a delicate balance of monopoly and public benefit.  
Circumventing the doctrines that have facilitated this delicate 
balance would permanently damage the incentive scheme set in 
place by the Constitution. 
 
 
